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RESTRICTEL
-2-
ARCHIVES 'NATIONAL AND
RECORDS
SERVICE"
convinced us of its good intentions. Mr. Hoffman indicated some of a
tear
rising pressure to use force and an increasing impatience primarily on the
part of the military, but also among the civilian population.
I said that I was not sure that I understood the proposal or what it might
accomplish. It seemed to me that the obstacles to disarmament were not surar-
mountable by discussion on our side because the real obstacles are created by
the USSR and not by the West; in fact, I personally find little misunderstanding
of the desirability and consequences of disarmament on the part of the military
in the West. The problem, however, is how to get at disarmament, i.e., how to
get the Soviets to talk with the West on any genuine basis.
Mr. Hoffman agreed with me, but he said that nevertheless he thinks
discussion would be helpful, that he himself believes that the results of
discussion would penetrate to the interior of the USSR. He pointed to
the desirability or even necessity of getting the population of, say, India
to understand what the West is seeking and what it means by disarmament.
Mr. Katz supported Mr. Hoffman's views and went over at some length sub-
stantially the same grounds. He stressed what he referred to as the "inter-
locking nature of strength and peace, " and he confessed to some nervousness
over the ability of a democratic government to restrain and control impatience
when its arsenal is filled, although he is looking ahead some twentyfour
months before that becomes critical.
I agreed with the importance of the subject of disarmanent and indi-
cated that I had been talking of it for the last three years. I pointed
out that it seemed to me more important to get high-level people working
on disarmament than to have them tälking about it. I pointed out that
there were both advantages and disadvantages in the application of the
Paris disarmament formula which, in my opinion, are not widely understood.
For example, in the event of a strict application of the formula, there
would be increased opportunities for small-scale and indirect aggression,
such as are occurring in Korea and Indochina now, and none of the Western
powers would be strong enough to intervene. However, I could not deny that
discussion of phases and stages of disarmament would be educational and
perhaps result in a broader and clearer understanding by the public of the
need for it and the consequences of it.
Messrs. Hoffman and Katz reiterated their views on the subject and
than the plan they have in mind is still quite tentative. In sum, they
believe that it is necessary now to hegin preparing the climate of public
opinion so that the danger of impatience is minimized at the time when
Western military strength reaches planned levels.
ReWPArmstrong:ejg
DECLASSIFIED
F.O. 10501
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Document data
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"ocrText": "RESTRICTEL\n-2-\nARCHIVES 'NATIONAL AND\nRECORDS\nSERVICE\"\nconvinced us of its good intentions. Mr. Hoffman indicated some of a\ntear\nrising pressure to use force and an increasing impatience primarily on the\npart of the military, but also among the civilian population.\nI said that I was not sure that I understood the proposal or what it might\naccomplish. It seemed to me that the obstacles to disarmament were not surar-\nmountable by discussion on our side because the real obstacles are created by\nthe USSR and not by the West; in fact, I personally find little misunderstanding\nof the desirability and consequences of disarmament on the part of the military\nin the West. The problem, however, is how to get at disarmament, i.e., how to\nget the Soviets to talk with the West on any genuine basis.\nMr. Hoffman agreed with me, but he said that nevertheless he thinks\ndiscussion would be helpful, that he himself believes that the results of\ndiscussion would penetrate to the interior of the USSR. He pointed to\nthe desirability or even necessity of getting the population of, say, India\nto understand what the West is seeking and what it means by disarmament.\nMr. Katz supported Mr. Hoffman's views and went over at some length sub-\nstantially the same grounds. He stressed what he referred to as the \"inter-\nlocking nature of strength and peace, \" and he confessed to some nervousness\nover the ability of a democratic government to restrain and control impatience\nwhen its arsenal is filled, although he is looking ahead some twentyfour\nmonths before that becomes critical.\nI agreed with the importance of the subject of disarmanent and indi-\ncated that I had been talking of it for the last three years. I pointed\nout that it seemed to me more important to get high-level people working\non disarmament than to have them tälking about it. I pointed out that\nthere were both advantages and disadvantages in the application of the\nParis disarmament formula which, in my opinion, are not widely understood.\nFor example, in the event of a strict application of the formula, there\nwould be increased opportunities for small-scale and indirect aggression,\nsuch as are occurring in Korea and Indochina now, and none of the Western\npowers would be strong enough to intervene. However, I could not deny that\ndiscussion of phases and stages of disarmament would be educational and\nperhaps result in a broader and clearer understanding by the public of the\nneed for it and the consequences of it.\nMessrs. Hoffman and Katz reiterated their views on the subject and\nthan the plan they have in mind is still quite tentative. In sum, they\nbelieve that it is necessary now to hegin preparing the climate of public\nopinion so that the danger of impatience is minimized at the time when\nWestern military strength reaches planned levels.\nReWPArmstrong:ejg\nDECLASSIFIED\nF.O. 10501"
}