Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Ambassador of Great Britain Sir Oliver Franks, Bernard A. B. Burrows, and John D. Jernegan

04545/5 TOP SECURITY INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation 124 DATE: August 11, 1952. SUBJECT: Message from Mr. Eden to Mr. Acheson regarding Iran 253 PARTICIPANTS: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador The Secretary Also Present: Mr. Burrows, Counselor, British Embassy NEA: Mr. Jernegan COPIES TO: s/s GTI u. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61120-1 I told the Ambassador that I was calling on him to have an informal talk about the message I had received from Mr. Eden, because I was not sure that I really under- stood what it meant. I hoped Sir Oliver would be able to clarify my thoughts. I begen by outlining the major elements in the message and pointed out that they seemed to contemplate a very rigid position on the part of the British Govern- ment. In particular, they appeared to require the submission to arbitration of 1) the validity of the Iranian nationalization law and 2) the manner in which the Iranian oil industry should be conducted in the future. I also noted with dismay the statement that Mr. Eden could not ask the oil company to move oil from Iran until the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement for arbitration nor to abandon its right to take legal action against other purchasers of the oil before a final settle- ment of the oil dispute had been reached. If my understanding of the message was correct, I said the only resemblance I could see between the aide menoire we had given to the British Government and Ma. Eden's reply was that they were both written on paper with a typewriter. I asked the Ambassador if he thought my impression was correct. Sir Oliver replied that there would seen to be substantial differences between our points of view, but he thought they were not so great as might appear at first. In the first part of the message, he said, Mr. Eden was pointing out that Dr. Mosadeq was a dubious character on whom too much reliance could not be placed. He also thought Mosadeq might not necessarily remain in power for a long time. There- fore, we should be cautious about over-committing ourselves to him and should be careful not to give him something DECLASSINED mi thout being sure that we would get something in return. STATE DEPT. LTR. 05-5-63 It followed Project NLT f2-4 By NLT- He NARS, Date 6-15-23 SOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION