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and ARCHIVES INATIONAL SERVIDE" AND A RECORDS & -2-> company In the economic field, he had given this matber some thought already, and before leaving the Hague had instructed his colleagues to prepare en Order in Council which would prohibit Dutch ships from visiting Chinese parta with the exception, of course, of Hong Kong and Macao. He folt he could assure the Secretary that his Government vould be disposed to cooperate in an undertaking of this nature. It might be of some assistance in preventing shipments from Indonesia and other parts such as Coloubo, Ceylon, as vell as preventing the charter of vessels by shippers exporting to Communist China. In the military field, he yould' expect that we vould probably wish to step up our military activity as an additional form of preseure in order to obtain an armistice. He was throughly in agreement that this should be done but wish to bring particularly to the Secretary's attention the matter of the possible increase of air activity on both sides, which might voll lead to the military desirability of boubing aix installations beyond the Yalu River. This vould bring about the prospect of considerably enlarging the present thentro of hostilities and the Dutch Govornment earnestly requested that it should be consulted in advance before any such military decision was taken. the Secrotary expressed keen interest in what the Foreign Minister had told him. He said that during these many nonths of magotiations to had found considerable evidence to substantiate en oginion that the Soviet and Chinese Communists hand in fact really desired an armistice. They were, however, out to mase the marimum depands that they could in obtaining it. The issue now seemed to be henging in the balance and every form of proasure that yo could administer was of the greatest importance. While the of the Dutch reprosentative in Peining would probably not influence the Chinese Commuste very greatly, since it seaned clear thay did not vent foreign representatives in Chinm, novertheless it vould be extromoly useful in showing mity en the part of the West. The economic messure mentioned by Mr. Luns could be of considerable help. In studying the Chinese economic situstion, wo had become convinced that reduction or stoppage of shiyments into China An fact created real preassure on them. The eutting down of shipments by sea into China hnd to be companented for by increased rail shipants over the Railrond. Thais in tuzen measts reduction in the amount of supplies already being received by rail. There was no doubt bixt that the Chinese vera in great need of both for the eivilian population and theix troogu, as vell as rubbes and other ray materials. Ho would welcome the Ordez in Council regarding Dutch shipe which Mr. Luns bad suggested. with zegard to the military sicuntion, the Secretary said ha could not give the Foreign Minister now information at this time because the matter was still under atudy by the military authorities. It seaned that the ro sumption of en offensive at this point vould require very heavy loss of life before the croogs could be in a tactical situation of mobility. This would be a decision that probably would hava to rest, not with the outgoing adminis- tration, but with the now government shout to be elected. This question of bombing air installations beyond the Yalu involved two considerations. First, the militery considered secreoy of the utmost importance in assuring the success of much an operation, and were opgosed on those grounds to prior consultation with other novernments. On the other hend from a political point of view, 1t wag fully

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ID
193225921
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Page context
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    "ocrText": "and ARCHIVES INATIONAL SERVIDE\" AND A\nRECORDS\n&\n-2->\ncompany\nIn the economic field, he had given this matber some thought already,\nand before leaving the Hague had instructed his colleagues to prepare en\nOrder in Council which would prohibit Dutch ships from visiting Chinese\nparta with the exception, of course, of Hong Kong and Macao. He folt he\ncould assure the Secretary that his Government vould be disposed to cooperate\nin an undertaking of this nature. It might be of some assistance in preventing\nshipments from Indonesia and other parts such as Coloubo, Ceylon, as vell as\npreventing the charter of vessels by shippers exporting to Communist China.\nIn the military field, he yould' expect that we vould probably wish to\nstep up our military activity as an additional form of preseure in order to\nobtain an armistice. He was throughly in agreement that this should be\ndone but wish to bring particularly to the Secretary's attention the matter\nof the possible increase of air activity on both sides, which might voll lead\nto the military desirability of boubing aix installations beyond the Yalu\nRiver. This vould bring about the prospect of considerably enlarging the\npresent thentro of hostilities and the Dutch Govornment earnestly requested\nthat it should be consulted in advance before any such military decision was\ntaken.\nthe Secrotary expressed keen interest in what the Foreign Minister had\ntold him. He said that during these many nonths of magotiations to had found\nconsiderable evidence to substantiate en oginion that the Soviet and Chinese\nCommunists hand in fact really desired an armistice. They were, however, out\nto mase the marimum depands that they could in obtaining it. The issue now\nseemed to be henging in the balance and every form of proasure that yo could\nadminister was of the greatest importance. While the of the Dutch\nreprosentative in Peining would probably not influence the Chinese Commuste\nvery greatly, since it seaned clear thay did not vent foreign representatives\nin Chinm, novertheless it vould be extromoly useful in showing mity en the\npart of the West. The economic messure mentioned by Mr. Luns could be of\nconsiderable help. In studying the Chinese economic situstion, wo had become\nconvinced that reduction or stoppage of shiyments into China An fact created\nreal preassure on them. The eutting down of shipments by sea into China hnd\nto be companented for by increased rail shipants over the\nRailrond. Thais in tuzen measts reduction in the amount of supplies already\nbeing received by rail. There was no doubt bixt that the Chinese vera in\ngreat need of both for the eivilian population and theix\ntroogu, as vell as rubbes and other ray materials. Ho would welcome the\nOrdez in Council regarding Dutch shipe which Mr. Luns bad suggested.\nwith zegard to the military sicuntion, the Secretary said ha could not\ngive the Foreign Minister now information at this time because the matter\nwas still under atudy by the military authorities. It seaned that the ro\nsumption of en offensive at this point vould require very heavy loss of life\nbefore the croogs could be in a tactical situation of mobility. This would\nbe a decision that probably would hava to rest, not with the outgoing adminis-\ntration, but with the now government shout to be elected. This question of\nbombing air installations beyond the Yalu involved two considerations. First,\nthe militery considered secreoy of the utmost importance in assuring the success\nof much an operation, and were opgosed on those grounds to prior consultation\nwith other novernments. On the other hend from a political point of view, 1t\nwag fully"
}