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and ARCHIVES INATIONAL SERVIDE" AND A
RECORDS
&
-2->
company
In the economic field, he had given this matber some thought already,
and before leaving the Hague had instructed his colleagues to prepare en
Order in Council which would prohibit Dutch ships from visiting Chinese
parta with the exception, of course, of Hong Kong and Macao. He folt he
could assure the Secretary that his Government vould be disposed to cooperate
in an undertaking of this nature. It might be of some assistance in preventing
shipments from Indonesia and other parts such as Coloubo, Ceylon, as vell as
preventing the charter of vessels by shippers exporting to Communist China.
In the military field, he yould' expect that we vould probably wish to
step up our military activity as an additional form of preseure in order to
obtain an armistice. He was throughly in agreement that this should be
done but wish to bring particularly to the Secretary's attention the matter
of the possible increase of air activity on both sides, which might voll lead
to the military desirability of boubing aix installations beyond the Yalu
River. This vould bring about the prospect of considerably enlarging the
present thentro of hostilities and the Dutch Govornment earnestly requested
that it should be consulted in advance before any such military decision was
taken.
the Secrotary expressed keen interest in what the Foreign Minister had
told him. He said that during these many nonths of magotiations to had found
considerable evidence to substantiate en oginion that the Soviet and Chinese
Communists hand in fact really desired an armistice. They were, however, out
to mase the marimum depands that they could in obtaining it. The issue now
seemed to be henging in the balance and every form of proasure that yo could
administer was of the greatest importance. While the of the Dutch
reprosentative in Peining would probably not influence the Chinese Commuste
very greatly, since it seaned clear thay did not vent foreign representatives
in Chinm, novertheless it vould be extromoly useful in showing mity en the
part of the West. The economic messure mentioned by Mr. Luns could be of
considerable help. In studying the Chinese economic situstion, wo had become
convinced that reduction or stoppage of shiyments into China An fact created
real preassure on them. The eutting down of shipments by sea into China hnd
to be companented for by increased rail shipants over the
Railrond. Thais in tuzen measts reduction in the amount of supplies already
being received by rail. There was no doubt bixt that the Chinese vera in
great need of both for the eivilian population and theix
troogu, as vell as rubbes and other ray materials. Ho would welcome the
Ordez in Council regarding Dutch shipe which Mr. Luns bad suggested.
with zegard to the military sicuntion, the Secretary said ha could not
give the Foreign Minister now information at this time because the matter
was still under atudy by the military authorities. It seaned that the ro
sumption of en offensive at this point vould require very heavy loss of life
before the croogs could be in a tactical situation of mobility. This would
be a decision that probably would hava to rest, not with the outgoing adminis-
tration, but with the now government shout to be elected. This question of
bombing air installations beyond the Yalu involved two considerations. First,
the militery considered secreoy of the utmost importance in assuring the success
of much an operation, and were opgosed on those grounds to prior consultation
with other novernments. On the other hend from a political point of view, 1t
wag fully
Page data
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- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 2646dcdd8032c3c5
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- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 193225921
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "and ARCHIVES INATIONAL SERVIDE\" AND A\nRECORDS\n&\n-2->\ncompany\nIn the economic field, he had given this matber some thought already,\nand before leaving the Hague had instructed his colleagues to prepare en\nOrder in Council which would prohibit Dutch ships from visiting Chinese\nparta with the exception, of course, of Hong Kong and Macao. He folt he\ncould assure the Secretary that his Government vould be disposed to cooperate\nin an undertaking of this nature. It might be of some assistance in preventing\nshipments from Indonesia and other parts such as Coloubo, Ceylon, as vell as\npreventing the charter of vessels by shippers exporting to Communist China.\nIn the military field, he yould' expect that we vould probably wish to\nstep up our military activity as an additional form of preseure in order to\nobtain an armistice. He was throughly in agreement that this should be\ndone but wish to bring particularly to the Secretary's attention the matter\nof the possible increase of air activity on both sides, which might voll lead\nto the military desirability of boubing aix installations beyond the Yalu\nRiver. This vould bring about the prospect of considerably enlarging the\npresent thentro of hostilities and the Dutch Govornment earnestly requested\nthat it should be consulted in advance before any such military decision was\ntaken.\nthe Secrotary expressed keen interest in what the Foreign Minister had\ntold him. He said that during these many nonths of magotiations to had found\nconsiderable evidence to substantiate en oginion that the Soviet and Chinese\nCommunists hand in fact really desired an armistice. They were, however, out\nto mase the marimum depands that they could in obtaining it. The issue now\nseemed to be henging in the balance and every form of proasure that yo could\nadminister was of the greatest importance. While the of the Dutch\nreprosentative in Peining would probably not influence the Chinese Commuste\nvery greatly, since it seaned clear thay did not vent foreign representatives\nin Chinm, novertheless it vould be extromoly useful in showing mity en the\npart of the West. The economic messure mentioned by Mr. Luns could be of\nconsiderable help. In studying the Chinese economic situstion, wo had become\nconvinced that reduction or stoppage of shiyments into China An fact created\nreal preassure on them. The eutting down of shipments by sea into China hnd\nto be companented for by increased rail shipants over the\nRailrond. Thais in tuzen measts reduction in the amount of supplies already\nbeing received by rail. There was no doubt bixt that the Chinese vera in\ngreat need of both for the eivilian population and theix\ntroogu, as vell as rubbes and other ray materials. Ho would welcome the\nOrdez in Council regarding Dutch shipe which Mr. Luns bad suggested.\nwith zegard to the military sicuntion, the Secretary said ha could not\ngive the Foreign Minister now information at this time because the matter\nwas still under atudy by the military authorities. It seaned that the ro\nsumption of en offensive at this point vould require very heavy loss of life\nbefore the croogs could be in a tactical situation of mobility. This would\nbe a decision that probably would hava to rest, not with the outgoing adminis-\ntration, but with the now government shout to be elected. This question of\nbombing air installations beyond the Yalu involved two considerations. First,\nthe militery considered secreoy of the utmost importance in assuring the success\nof much an operation, and were opgosed on those grounds to prior consultation\nwith other novernments. On the other hend from a political point of view, 1t\nwag fully"
}