Memorandum, From Hearings on Military Situation in Far East

From Hearings on Military Situation in Far East, p. 737-738 S. is AND General Bradley. I am reading from a note I have in my book, sir. We are forced to the conclusion, based upon all the factors known to us, including particu- larly those presented in your recent message, that it is infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist China, to hold the position in Korea for a pro- tracted period. It would be to our national interests, however, and also to the interests of the UN, before you issue firm instructions for initiation of evacua- tion of troops from Korea to gain some further time for essential military and diplomatic consultations with UN countries participating in Korean effort. It is important also to the future of UN and NATO organizations, to the United States prestige world-wide, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia, that maximum practical punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors and that Korea not be evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations. In Washington it is not possible to evaluate present state of morale and combat efficiency of UN forces. /Deleted7 In your messages of 30 December 1950 and January 4 1951, you had indicated it would not be necessary to make an anticipatory decision to evacuate until our forces had arrived at the old Pusan beachhead. Including consideration of the factors out- lined above, your estimate is desired as to timing and conditions under which you will have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea. Directive contained in paragraph (c) of our message of 9 January meanwhile remains in effect. That was, as I said, to fight in successive positions.