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CFM S. 3 us AND Have outlined method of work for preparation for CFM. Now deal with substantive ideas. First procedures. 1. We had attempted to get US positions clear, working within The Department, with the Defense Department, and with the President. 2. We had preliminary discussions at so-called "official" level, with British and French. 3. We would then have ministerial discussions with British and French in Paris prior to May 23. 4. CFM -- May 23. A good deal of work had gone on in Department. Phil Jessup -- I do not recall who accompanied him -- went in charge of the advance group. He conferred with Ivone Kirkpatrick and Paradis. As I recall it, the people who worked with me at the preparatory meetings were Jessup, Bohlen, Kennan, Nitze, Murphy. At an early stage we discussed some broad questions. One factor in the instability of Europe and the fear of Russia arose from the presence of Russian armies in the middle of Europe, 100 miles from the Rhine. If these armies were in Russia behind the marshes, the situation would be greatly improved. True the former containing effect of German and Japanese military power would still be lacking. But matter deserved and received serious exploration. Points considered: Mutual withdrawal of all armies, including ours, to home countries would have disastrous net effect on Europe and undo whole purpose of North Atlantic Treaty. Consideration given to withdrawal of armies to entlaves on periphera of Germany. Defense thought highly dangerous. Bradley and Vorhees joined our CFM meeting on May 12. From military point of view such move would leave Russian forces in position to jump off -- and would leave ours in highly dangerous strategic and tactical positions. In case military withdrawal necessary it would endanger positions and access to sea. Would also preclude forward strategy.