Ask the Scholar
Page 2 of 20
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
(Page 2)
HST maintained that despite "some unavoidable economic
dislocations and inflationary pressures" the nation had
thus far carried the burden of the major national security
programs, including the mutual security program, with
"remarkably little strain. He expressed the opinion,
therefore, that with the continuing expansion of national
production, present security expenditures were "clearly
TROMAN
within our economic capacity" and might even be carried
more easily in the years ahead. He held that the $7.9
ARCHIVES 'NATIONAL RECORDS AND
billion contemplated for the mutual security program would
SERVICE'
"bring returns no other policy could hope to produce so
s
economically, " and the only question about the amount was
not whether it was too large, but whether it might be too
small.
Harriman and DGA
Hearings began on March 13th with House and Senate commit-
testify
tees meeting jointly. Testifying first, Harriman stressed
especially his belief that the proposed size of the program
should not be reduced. He agreed that it could of course
be cut, as any program could be cut, but said that he was
convinced that such action would "reduce the strength
which is being built in the free world" for common defense
and would " gravely imperil" the national security.
Both Harriman and DGA, who testified next, emphasized the
importance of the European "defense support" funds. Harri-
man stated that they were "not designed to provide our
European partners with the means to live in comfort while
we shoulder the burden of rearmement, If but at a "conserva-
tive calculation" would result in military preparedness
worth two or three times the actual amount expended.
In addition to praising the "solid progress" made by the
European nations toward tefense goals and expressing the
opinion that increased programs for the current year
"approached the limits" of European capacity, DGA made
four major points: (1) the present was a historically
important moment during which the US could, by its policies,
press forward with the movement for a unified Europe or
lose the opportunity to achieve results sought for certu-
ries; (2) the limitations on the European economies were
"real limitations which could not be removed by "exhorta-
tion or by carping" but only by intelligent assistance;
(3) technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped
countries must be devised and timed to meet the conditions
of the particular country concerned, which meant that
although long-term, less costly projects were desirable
in some areas, in others, particularly Asia, the "flowing
tide of nationalism", "desperate discontent" and "ferment
of communism" created an urgent need for immediate and
effective action; and (4) situations of "utmost gravity"
confronted the free mations in the Far East, making it
Page data
- Page
- 2
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- fd548f302e4a9b56
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 75848880
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "75848880",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848880",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Synopsis M, Developments Subsequent to Lisbon, March-June, 1952",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848880",
"collections": [
"Dean Acheson Papers",
"Princeton Seminars Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722150-14-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722150-14-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722150-14-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 20,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "75848880",
"label": "Synopsis M, Developments Subsequent to Lisbon, March-June, 1952",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848880"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "75848880",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848880",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Synopsis M, Developments Subsequent to Lisbon, March-June, 1952",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848880",
"collections": [
"Dean Acheson Papers",
"Princeton Seminars Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722150-14-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722150-14-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722150-14-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 20,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848880",
"naId": 75848880,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"logicalDate": "1953-01-01",
"year": 1953
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 2,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722150-14-02.jpg",
"mediaId": "fd548f302e4a9b56",
"ocrText": "(Page 2)\nHST maintained that despite \"some unavoidable economic\ndislocations and inflationary pressures\" the nation had\nthus far carried the burden of the major national security\nprograms, including the mutual security program, with\n\"remarkably little strain. He expressed the opinion,\ntherefore, that with the continuing expansion of national\nproduction, present security expenditures were \"clearly\nTROMAN\nwithin our economic capacity\" and might even be carried\nmore easily in the years ahead. He held that the $7.9\nARCHIVES 'NATIONAL RECORDS AND\nbillion contemplated for the mutual security program would\nSERVICE'\n\"bring returns no other policy could hope to produce so\ns\neconomically, \" and the only question about the amount was\nnot whether it was too large, but whether it might be too\nsmall.\nHarriman and DGA\nHearings began on March 13th with House and Senate commit-\ntestify\ntees meeting jointly. Testifying first, Harriman stressed\nespecially his belief that the proposed size of the program\nshould not be reduced. He agreed that it could of course\nbe cut, as any program could be cut, but said that he was\nconvinced that such action would \"reduce the strength\nwhich is being built in the free world\" for common defense\nand would \" gravely imperil\" the national security.\nBoth Harriman and DGA, who testified next, emphasized the\nimportance of the European \"defense support\" funds. Harri-\nman stated that they were \"not designed to provide our\nEuropean partners with the means to live in comfort while\nwe shoulder the burden of rearmement, If but at a \"conserva-\ntive calculation\" would result in military preparedness\nworth two or three times the actual amount expended.\nIn addition to praising the \"solid progress\" made by the\nEuropean nations toward tefense goals and expressing the\nopinion that increased programs for the current year\n\"approached the limits\" of European capacity, DGA made\nfour major points: (1) the present was a historically\nimportant moment during which the US could, by its policies,\npress forward with the movement for a unified Europe or\nlose the opportunity to achieve results sought for certu-\nries; (2) the limitations on the European economies were\n\"real limitations which could not be removed by \"exhorta-\ntion or by carping\" but only by intelligent assistance;\n(3) technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped\ncountries must be devised and timed to meet the conditions\nof the particular country concerned, which meant that\nalthough long-term, less costly projects were desirable\nin some areas, in others, particularly Asia, the \"flowing\ntide of nationalism\", \"desperate discontent\" and \"ferment\nof communism\" created an urgent need for immediate and\neffective action; and (4) situations of \"utmost gravity\"\nconfronted the free mations in the Far East, making it"
}