Ask the Scholar
Page 10 of 16
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
(Synopsis D, page 10)
"However, it should be emphasized that, by law, only the President
can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization
has been given. If and when such authorization should be given,
the military commander in the field would have charge of the
tactical delivery of the weapon. In brief, the replies to the
questions at today's press conference do not represent any change
S.
in this situation.
ARCHIVESA
INCLATIONAL
AND
Also on the 30th the Chinse Communist representative told the
US SERVICES
Security Council that although he had stated that he would not
participate in the discussion of the Korean question along the
lines being followed by the Council, the US representative had
"very strangely" asked him a number of questions and had "used a
threatening tone.' He declared that these "threats" did not frighten
him and that he still refused to discuss "this so-called complaint. "
The USSR Vetoes
The Council rejected, by a vote of 9 to 1, the proposal submitted
Resolution on
by the Chinese Communist representative and sponsored by the Soviet
China
Union, which would have condemned the US for armed aggression
against Formosa and Korea, and would have called for the withdrawal
of the US and "all other countries" from Korea. The six-power
draft resolution condemning the Chinese Communist intervention in
Korea, offering reassurances of the peaceful intentions of the UN
toward Communist China, and pledging that the Chinese frontier
would remain inviolate, was then vetoed by the USSR. The Indian
representative did not participate in any of the voting, because he
had not received instructions from his government.
Debate in
At the opening of a two-debate on foreign policy in the House of
Britain
Commons on November 29th, Bevin discussed the Chinese Communist
intervention in Korea. He said that, without knowing what the
motives behind the Chinese action were, he nevertheless felt con-
vinced that the conflict could be localized if the Communist regime
desired it. It was essential, he said, first to stabilize the
situation and then to seek a political solution. Bevin told the
House that within the last 24 hours he had been assured by the US
that its policy was identical with that of Great Britain, which
was "to resist aggression, to localise the hostilities, and to
settle the Korean problem on a basis satisfactory to the UN.
In answer to widespread criticism of the action of General MacArthur
in launching the large-scale offensive against the Chinese, Bevin
said that it was necessary to leave control of operations largely
in the hands of MacArthur, but assured the House that on plans
involving general policy, there had been "appropriate consultations.
Bevin also maintained that dempite the aggression the British govern-
ment had pursued the only realistic policy in recognizing Communist
China, and said that he still believed it should be represented in
the UN Security Council,
Page data
- Page
- 10
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- b97bc84d7fffe116
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 75848949
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "75848949",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848949",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Synopsis D, Korea - Diplomatic-Political Developments, September-December 1950",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848949",
"collections": [
"Dean Acheson Papers",
"Princeton Seminars Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-05-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-05-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-05-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 16,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "75848949",
"label": "Synopsis D, Korea - Diplomatic-Political Developments, September-December 1950",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848949"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "75848949",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848949",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Synopsis D, Korea - Diplomatic-Political Developments, September-December 1950",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848949",
"collections": [
"Dean Acheson Papers",
"Princeton Seminars Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-05-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-05-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-05-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 16,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848949",
"naId": 75848949,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"logicalDate": "1953-01-01",
"year": 1953
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 10,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-05-10.jpg",
"mediaId": "b97bc84d7fffe116",
"ocrText": "(Synopsis D, page 10)\n\"However, it should be emphasized that, by law, only the President\ncan authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization\nhas been given. If and when such authorization should be given,\nthe military commander in the field would have charge of the\ntactical delivery of the weapon. In brief, the replies to the\nquestions at today's press conference do not represent any change\nS.\nin this situation.\nARCHIVESA\nINCLATIONAL\nAND\nAlso on the 30th the Chinse Communist representative told the\nUS SERVICES\nSecurity Council that although he had stated that he would not\nparticipate in the discussion of the Korean question along the\nlines being followed by the Council, the US representative had\n\"very strangely\" asked him a number of questions and had \"used a\nthreatening tone.' He declared that these \"threats\" did not frighten\nhim and that he still refused to discuss \"this so-called complaint. \"\nThe USSR Vetoes\nThe Council rejected, by a vote of 9 to 1, the proposal submitted\nResolution on\nby the Chinese Communist representative and sponsored by the Soviet\nChina\nUnion, which would have condemned the US for armed aggression\nagainst Formosa and Korea, and would have called for the withdrawal\nof the US and \"all other countries\" from Korea. The six-power\ndraft resolution condemning the Chinese Communist intervention in\nKorea, offering reassurances of the peaceful intentions of the UN\ntoward Communist China, and pledging that the Chinese frontier\nwould remain inviolate, was then vetoed by the USSR. The Indian\nrepresentative did not participate in any of the voting, because he\nhad not received instructions from his government.\nDebate in\nAt the opening of a two-debate on foreign policy in the House of\nBritain\nCommons on November 29th, Bevin discussed the Chinese Communist\nintervention in Korea. He said that, without knowing what the\nmotives behind the Chinese action were, he nevertheless felt con-\nvinced that the conflict could be localized if the Communist regime\ndesired it. It was essential, he said, first to stabilize the\nsituation and then to seek a political solution. Bevin told the\nHouse that within the last 24 hours he had been assured by the US\nthat its policy was identical with that of Great Britain, which\nwas \"to resist aggression, to localise the hostilities, and to\nsettle the Korean problem on a basis satisfactory to the UN.\nIn answer to widespread criticism of the action of General MacArthur\nin launching the large-scale offensive against the Chinese, Bevin\nsaid that it was necessary to leave control of operations largely\nin the hands of MacArthur, but assured the House that on plans\ninvolving general policy, there had been \"appropriate consultations.\nBevin also maintained that dempite the aggression the British govern-\nment had pursued the only realistic policy in recognizing Communist\nChina, and said that he still believed it should be represented in\nthe UN Security Council,"
}