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    "label": "Synopsis D, Korea - Diplomatic-Political Developments, September-December 1950",
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    "title": "Synopsis D, Korea - Diplomatic-Political Developments, September-December 1950",
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    "ocrText": "Page 1\nsi\nKOREA - Synopsis D: Diplomatic-Political Developments,\nU.S.\nALCURDSAND\nSERVICE\"\nLIBRARY\nSeptember-December 1950\nGOVERNMENT\nUN Assembly\nWith the advance of UN forces in Korea during the latter part of\nAction on the\nSeptember (see Synopsis C), the General Assembly took up the question\nFuture of\nof Korea's future. On October 7th, after debate and amendment in the\nKorea\nPolitical and Security Committee during the previous week, the\nGeneral Assembly passed a resolution \"on the problem of the indepen-\ndence of Korea. 11 The vote was 47 to 5, with 8 abstentions.\nWhile the question of whether UN forces should cross the 38th\nparallel was not specifically mentioned in the resolution, there\nseemed to be general agreement in UN circles that the resolution\nimplied tacit consent of such military action. Relevant parts of\nthe resolution follow:\n\"The General Assembly.\n\"Recommends (a) That all appropriate steps be taken to ensure con-\nditions of stability throughout Korea, (b) That all constituent\nacts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the\nauspices of the UN, for the establishment of a unified, indepen-\ndent and democratic Government in the sovereign State of Korea,\n(c) That all sections and representative bodies of the population\nof Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs\nof the UN in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections\nand in the establishment of a unified Government, (d) That UN\nforces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far\nas necessary for achieving the objectives specified at (a) and (b)\nabove, (e) That all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the\neconomic rehabilitation of Korea;\n\"Resolves that\n'(a) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands,\nPakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey, to be known as the\nUN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea be\nestablished to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the\npresent UN Commission in Korea, (ii) represent the UN in bringing\nabout the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic\nGovernment of all Korea, (iii) exercise such responsibilities in\nconnexion with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be deter-\nmined by the General Assembly\n(b) Pending the arrival in Korea of the UN Commission. Govern-\nments represented on the Commission should form an interim committee\ncomposed of their permanent representatives at the Seat of the UN\nto consult with and advise the UN Unified Command in the light of\nthe above recommendations;\nThe US Position\nThe US position on the resolution was expressed during the debate\nin the Political and Security Committee by Austin. He said in part:\n\" The political aspect of the problem identified with the Thirty-\neighth Parallel becomes a matter of major concern for the UN. The\nquestion of whether this artificial barrier shall remain, and\nwhether the country shall be united now must be determined by\n(Synopsis D, page 2)\nthe UN\nThe artificial barrier which has divided North and South\nKorea has no basis for existence either in law or in reason.\nNeither the UN, its Commission on Korea, nor the ROK recognize\nU.S. SERVICES, LIBRARY\nsuch a line. Now the North Koreans, by armed attack upon the\nROK, have denied the reality of such a line Let us not, at this\nGOVERNMENT\ncritical hour\nerect such a boundary\nThe US, therefore, welcomes\nthe declaration in the draft resolution before you that UN forces\nwould remain in Korea only as long as is necessary to carry out\nthe General Assembly's recommendations\nAn enduring solution of\nthe Korean problem should, in the view of the US, include these\nelements:\n\"First: Establishment of a free, independent and united country.\n\"Second: Establishment of a strong UN Commission to consult with\nall appropriate authorities and individuals and to make recommenda-\ntions for carrying out the unification process.\n\"Third: Selection of representatives of the Korean people in free\nelections conducted under the auspices of the UN Commission.\n\"Fourth: Consultation with the Government of the ROK in all matters\npertaining to the future of Korea.\n\"Fifth: Vigorous UN efforts to assist the reconstruction and develop-\nment of Korea.\n\"Sixth: The retention of UN forces in Korea only as long as is\nnecessary for the achievement of UN objectives.\n\"Seventh: Elimination of special privileges for any nation and the\ndevelopment of friendly relations with all.\n\"And Eighth: Admission of Korea to the UN and assumption by her\nof the obligations, duties and privileges of membership.\"\nThe Wake Island\nThe Wake Island meeting between HST and MacArthur was held on\nMeeting\nOctober 15th. Subsequently a statement was issued which said, in part:\n\"Primarily, we talked about the problems in Korea which are General\nMacArthur's most pressing responsibilities\nWe\ndevoted\na\ngood\ndeal\nof time to the major problem of peaceful reconstruction which the\nUN is facing and to the solution of which we intend to make the best\ncontribution of which the US is capable\n\"\nHST reported that they\nalso discussed the Japanese Peace Treaty proposal and other problems\nof the Pacific area. At a press conference on the 19th HST denied\nhe had discussed the question of Formosa with MacArthur, noting\nthat the question of US policy toward Formosa had been enunciated\nmany times and was a settled matter.\nDeliberations\nThe Interim Committee on Korea, established in accordance with the\nof the Interim\nUN General Assembly resolution of October 7th, held its first meeting\nCommittee\non October 10th. On the 12th it approved a resolution which stated,\nin part, that the Interim Committee on Korea,\n\"Advises the Unified Command to assume provisionally all responsi-\nbilities for the Government and civil administration of those parts\nof Korea which had not been recognized by the UN as being under the\neffective control of the Government of the ROK at the outbreak of\n(Synopsis D, page.3)\nhostilities, and which may now come under occupation of UN forces,\npending consideration by the UN Commission for the Unification and\nRehabilitation of Korea of the administration of these territories; and\n\"Recommends that the Unified Command take immediate steps to associate\nwith all authorities established for civilian administration in\naccordance with the present resolution officers from the several\nforces of members of the UN serving under the Unified Command in\nKorea.\"\nTRUMAN\nOn the 13th of October, the Interim Committee met again, in closed\nis\nLIBRARY\nsession, to hear the views of the US on the future of Korea. US\nHARRY\nARCHIVES AND RECORDS\nRepresentative Ross outlined a tentative plan for fulfilling the\noccupation responsibilities of the Unified Command. The plan en-\nU.S.\nvisioned three phases in the military occupation which would result\nin a gradual transfer of control from military to civilian authorities.\nThe phases, as outlined, were:\n1. From the beginning of the occupation until the establishment of\ninternal security throughout the greater part of North Korea. In\nthis state, which the US hoped would be brief, security considerations\nwould be paramount and MacArthur would be the supreme authority.\nCivil affairs action by the military would be limited largely to\nemergency relief, the establishment and maintenance of law and\norder, and the initial establishment or reactivation of de facto\nlocal or provincial governments.\n2. From the establishment of security until the election of a\nnational government capable of assuring responsibility over the\nunified country. During this stage, MacArthur would continue his\nauthority to ensure security, with the advice and recommendations\nof the UN Commission. Resumption of normal political and economic\nactivity would be encouraged.\n3. From the assumption of power by a national government until the\nwithdrawal of all non-Korean forces of the UN. Only a minimum of\nUN troops would remain in Korea during this final phase.\nRoss said that the US believed it would be unwise for the occupation\nforces to seek to impose a complete governmental administration in\nNorth Korea. He said that some supervision and control over pro-\nvincial and local authorities probably would be necessary, but\nexpressed the view that until the new UN Commission started to\nfunction, as little change as possible should be made in the funda-\nmental structure which is found in North Korea.\nThe committee decided to study the views of the US at its next\nmeeting. Also on the 13th the committee adopted a resolution\nrequesting members of the former UN Commission on Korea \"who are\nin a position to do so to remain in Korea until the arrival of\nthe new Commission and observe and report to the Interim\nCommittee as may be required on developments which concern the\nGeneral Assembly's objective of restoring peace and stability\nthroughout Korea.'\nTRUMAN\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\n(Synopsis D, page 4)\nGOVERNMENT\nRhee objects\nAs soon as the resolution of the committee restricting the\nauthority of his government was made public, Rhee expressed \"serious\nconcern.\" Following a meeting of the ROK cabinet on October 15th,\na message was sent to all UN members stating that \"the Govern-\nment of Korea finds these proposals unacceptable as being wrong in\nprinciple and untenable in practice, since they disregard the\nsovereign status and right of the Government of the ROK. 11 Rhee\nsaid two days later that his government was sending civil adminis-\ntrators into liberated areas of North Korea as a temporary measure.\nA bloc of 100 seats in the National Assembly had been set aside for\nrepresentatives of North Korea, and governors for the five northern\nprovinces had been appointed in 1948. Rhee explained that the\nofficials had been carefully picked from among North Koreans who\nhad fled from the Communist regime, and he declared that if they\nwere unpopular with the people or unfit for their jobs, they would\nbe replaced.\nIt was reported without official confirmation on October 30th that\nMacArthur was taking steps to prevent the South Korean government\nfrom extending its authority into North Korea. The report said\nthat the five governors appointed for the northern provinces had\nnot been allowed to assume their posts. On the same day, Rhee,\nduring his first visit to Pyongyang since the fall of the northern\ncapital, told a gathering of an estimated 10,000 Koreans that\nKorea \"automatically\" had been unified through defeat of the North\nKorean Communists by the UN. He told the Koreans that they soon\nwould participate in the government of all Korea.\nThe UN Tackles\nOn November 6th the UN received the special report (see Synopsis c)\nthe question\nof MacArthur which took note of \"the continued employment of\nof Chinese\nChinese Communist forces in Korea.' Also on the 6th Austin read\nIntervention\nthis report to the members of the UN Security Council and asked\nthat a special meeting of the Council be called as soon as possible\nto consider the Korean situation in the light of the report. On\nthe 7th, the Interim Committee unanimously adopted a Philippine\nresolution calling on representatives of its members in Korea to\n\"lend all practicable assistance in respect to questions relating\nto the North Korean frontier.\" The resolution stated that the\ncommittee believed \"it should concern itself with questions relating\nto the northern frontier of Korea in order that the frontier may be\nfully respected.\" Romulo, Interim Committee chairman, pointed out\nthat the intervention of Chinese Communists in the North Korean\nfighting \"may be occasioned in part by [their] concern in regard\nto interests in the Korean-Manchurian frontier\" and that for this\nreason he thought it important for the committee to \"issue an\nimmediate declaration with the end in view of reassuring the Chinese\nCommunists regarding the intentions of the UN.\"\nOn November 8th the Security Council met to consider the special\nreport from MacArthur. Malik opposed placing the subject on the\nagenda, but it was adopted by a vote of 10 to 1. Malik then\nproposed that a representative of Communist China be invited to\n(Synopsis D, page 5)\ntake part in all Council discussions of the Korean problem, but\nthis was rejected by a vote of 3 to 2, with 6 abstentions. The\nCouncil then took up an amended version of the Soviet proposal,\nsubmitted by the British, that would have the Security Council\n\"invite, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, a\nrepresentative of the Central People's Government of the\nPeople's Republic of China to be present during discussion by\nthe Council of the Special Report of the UN Command in Korea.\"\nAustin stated the views of the US delegation on the amended pro-\nposal as follows: \"I think it is well known in the organs of the\nUN that the US has been and is most strongly opposed to the\nseating in the UN of the Communist Chinese regime\nBut the\npresent facts which are before us could be interpreted as a provoca-\ntion to general war. This makes a difference in the problem that\nconfronts\nus\nthan when we were considering a petition to admit\nthe representative of the North Korean aggressors to the Council\nThere might be gained some information from witnesses from the\nChinese Communist regime which might guide us toward prevention.\nof an extension of the existing struggle in Korea\nI reject the\nconcept of an invitation\nI believe that this regime should not\nbe invited, but rather they should be summoned to appear before\nthis organ in their true character, with its primary responsibility\nfor the maintenance of peace.\"\nAustin did not formally suggest any change in the wording of the\nis\nTRUMAN\ndraft resolution, however, and the British proposal was adopted\nin its original form by a vote of 8 to 2 (China and Cuba), with\nRECORDS\n1 abstention (Egypt).\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nLIBRARY\nGOVERNMENT\nOn November 11th the Chinese Communist government rejected the\ninvitation of the Security Council. A message signed by Chou\nEn-lai said that the invitation could not be accepted \"because\naccording to the contents of the resolution, this invitation\ndeprives the representative of\n[Red] China of the right to\ndiscussion in the Security Council the most pressing question of\nthe Chinese people, namely, the question of armed intervention in\nKorea and aggression against China by the US Government, and limits\nthe right of the Chinese representative to the discussion of the\nspecial report of the so-called UN command. \" Chou offered as an\nalternative proposal that the Security Council \"combine the dis-\ncussion of the accusation raised by the\nPeople's Republic of\nChina against armed aggression on Taiwan by the US\nand the dis-\ncussion of the question of armed intervention in Korea by the US\n\"\nDGA Comments\nOn the 15th of November DGA said in Washington that Chinese inter-\nvention in Korea \"presents a very difficult problem for everyone.\"\nHe explained that if the Chinese Communists \"believe, as their\npropaganda states, that the UN or the US have any ulterior\ndesigns in Manchuria everything possible must be done to disabuse\nthem of such an illusion because it is not true.\" DGA granted\nthat they may have \"worries about their legitimate interests in the\nis\nTRUMAN\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECURDS\nLIBRARY\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\n(Synopsis D, page 6)\nGOVERNMENT\nborder river and in the contiguous territories on either side.\"\nBut, he said, if that is so, \"everything in the world should be\ndone and is being done to make them understand that their proper\ninterests will be taken care of.\" In conclusion, DGA warned:\n\"If, on the other hand, the Chinese have been led either by ignorance\nor by some other means to precipitate a really grave crisis in the\nworld, then that must be met with all the resolution, and all the\nsoberness, and all the wisdom at our command. We hope that is not\nthe case. It would be a tragedy of the most colossal nature if\nthat were so, and, therefore, we must explore carefully and wisely\nevery possibility of ending this Korean aggression in accordance\nwith the principles of the Charter of the UN.\"\nOn November 16th HST emphasized this same policy at his news con-\nference. He also urged all members of the UN Security Council to\nsupport a six-power draft resolution submitted on the 10th which\ncalled on the Chinese Communists to withdraw their forces from\nKorea.\nAlso on the 16th, HST's statement was read at a meeting of the\nSecurity Council by Gross, after Malik had read into the record the\nstatement of Chou En-lai of the 11th. Malik told the Council that\nhe would veto the joint draft resolution calling for the withdrawal\nof Chinese Communist troops from Korea. He declared that the only\nbasis for a settlement would be the withdrawal of all \"foreign\"\nforces from Korea.\nPeiping Comments On the 17th a Peiping radio broadcase said, in part: \"Observers\nhere noted the pretended surprise evinced by American spokesmen\nthat anyone could think for one moment that the Americans harbor\naggressive intentions against China. It is not convincing anyone\nhere\nThe Chinese people have the record and can judge for\nthemselves\nAmerica has lied and smashed her way across the world\nto Chinese territory and into it, has seized Chinese Taiwan and is\nthreatening another neighbor, Vietnam.\"\nThe first item on the agenda of the Security Council on the 17th\nwas the question of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. How-\never, since no member expressed a wish to speak on the subject, and\nsince no attempt was made to put the six-power draft resolution to\na vote, the Council proceeded with the next agenda item.\nIzvestia\nOn November 19th \"Izvestia\" charged in an editorial that the US\nComments\nwas seeking to establish in the Security Council a formal basis\nfor a UN-sanctioned open attack upon Communist China. The editorial\nsaid that the US government was conducting a provocative and\naggressive policy against the People's Republic of China and\n\"uttering threats directed at the Soviet Union.\" The article\nstated also that the Soviet people were capable of defending Soviet\nsoil with arms, if necessary.\nS.\nTRUMAN\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\n(Synopsis D, page 7)\nGOVERNMENT\nDGA Denies\nOn the 22nd DGA denied that agreement had been reached among the\nAgreement\nWestern nations for a \"buffer zone\" on the south bank of the Yalu,\nbut rumors persisted that such a plan would be offered to the\nChinese Communist delegation when it arrived at Lake Success.\nThe British Foreign Office announced on the 23rd that the British\ngovernment had sent a message to the Chinese Communist authorities\na day earlier, assuring the Peiping government that UN forces in\nKorea had no design on China or Chinese interests. The announce-\nment said that the action had been taken unilaterally, although\nthe US and other friendly nations had been informed that the note\nwas being sent.\nDebate in the\nThe nine-member Chinese Communist delegation arrived in New York on\nSecurity\nthe 24th and appeared before the Security Council for the first\nCouncil\ntime on the 27th. An agenda dispute caused a postponement of the\ndebate on Korea until the 28th. Austin opened the debate with a\nstatement based on MacArthur's communiqué of the 28th (see Synopsis C)\nwhich referred to \"an entirely new war.\" Austin said, in part:\n\"Last week the forces of the UN opened a general attack designed\nto finish their assigned task of repulsing aggression and restoring\ninternational peace and security in the area. This attack has now\nbeen repulsed in circumstances which make it clear that Chinese\nCommunist armed forces totaling more than 200,000 men are now\nengaged in North Korea. They are supported by heavy reinforcements\nmoving forward from behind the international boundary. It now\nappears doubtful that the war in Korea can be quickly concluded.\nIt also appears clear beyond any doubt that what all the free world\nhoped was an intervention for a limited purpose is in fact aggression,\noutright and naked. The consequences of these facts must be faced\nsquarely by the people of the world, and more particularly by this\nCouncil.\"\nAfter repeating the assurances that neither the US nor the UN had\nany designs against any part of China, Austin then put to the\nChinese Communist representative a series of questions, in which\nhe raised among others the following points: (1) whether the\nCommunist intervention in Korea was \"really in the interest of the\nChinese people, as has been proclaimed,\" or whether it was on\n\"behalf\" of the Soviet Union; (2) whether it was still maintained\nthat the Chinese forces in Korea are \"composed entirely of\nvolunteers,\" and if so, how could be explained \"the 'voluntary'\nmanner in which their supplies have been organized, dispatched\nacross the frontier, and distributed\"; (3) why had the Chinese\nCommunists ignored and set aside the \"reiterated statements\" by\nthe UN and by the US that \"there were no designs on Chinese terri-\ntory or legitimate interests\"; (4) whether the Peiping authorities\nwill respond to the central paragraph of the draft resolution\nbefore the Council, i.e., \"to refrain from assisting or encouraging\nthe North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individ-\nuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North\nKorean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such\nnationals, individuals, or units which might presently be in\nKorea\"; and (5) will there be peace or war in the Far East?\"\n$\nTRUMAH\nAddress\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\n(Synopsis D, page 8)\nGOVERNMENT\nChinse Communist Representative Wu Hsiu-chuan said that as the\nSecurity Council had already been advised by his government, the\nPeiping delegation would not discuss the question of Chinese\nCommunist intervention in Korea, although it was prepared to\ncombine a discussion of the \"complaint of armed invasion of\nTaiwan\" with the \"accusation against armed intervention in\nKorea by the US Government.\" Wu said, in part:\n\"The creation of civil war in Korea by the US Government was\ndesigned solely to furnish a pretext for launching armed aggression\nagainst Korea and against our territory, Taiwan, and for tightening\nits control in Vietnam and in the Philippines\nFrom\nthe\nvery\nout-\nset, the US armed aggression against Korea gravely threatened\nChina's security\nTo say that the civil war in Korea would\naffect the security of the US is a flagrant, deceitful absurdity.\nBut there is only a narrow river between Korea and China\nUnder\nsuch circumstances, the US armed aggression against Korea cannot\nbe regarded as a matter which concerns theKorean people alone.\"\nWu then requested the Council \"immediately [to] adopt effective\nmeasures to bring about the withdrawal from Korea of the armed\nforces of the US and all other countries and to leave the people\nof North and South Korea to settle the domestic affairs of Korea\nthemselves, so that a peaceful solution of the Korean question\n[might] be achieved.\"\nAustin replied to Wu on November 29th. He said that the Chinese\nCommunist representative, who had been \"invited here to give infor-\nmation and shed light,\" had given instead \"distortions, slanders,\nhalf-truths and outright lines. Austin said that Wu had declined\nto answer his questions directly, \"but here, as elsewhere, he did\nanswer them, either by his silence when he was bound by the cir-\ncumstances to speak or by his statement here revealing the attitude\nof an aggressor.\" Austin declared: \"Let the Chinese Communist\nregime take thought before it persists in attacking the UN forces\nand committing acts of aggression against Korea.\" Austin then\ncalled on the Security Council \"to lay aside for now the fantastic\ncharge of US aggression against Formosa and proceed with the con-\nsideration of the six-power draft resolution on Korea.\"\nDGA Speaks of\nSerious Crisis\nAlso on November 29th DGA delivered a major foreign policy speech.\nHe pointed out that \"the peaceful nations of the world [had] made\nit unmistakably clear that if the Chinese Communist intervention\nhad a limited motivation, if it sprang from an uncertainty regard-\ning the intentions of the UN forces, the matter could be settled\nwithout enlarging the conflict.\" But, DGA continued, \"at the\nvery moment when representatives of these Chinese Communist\nauthorities appeared at the headquarters of the UN, claiming the\nright to speak before this world organization in the name of the\nChinese people, the cloak of pretense had been thrown off.\"\nDGA pointed out that \"the questions raised by these acts of\naggression in Korea\nto be fully understood\nmust be seen as\nU.S. SERVICE\" RECORDSAND s. TRUMAN LIBRARY\n(Synopsis D, page 9)\nGOVERNMENT\npart of the worldwide operations of the international Communist\nmovement. \" He said that \"the hostility of Soviet intentions,\ntaken alone, would not produce so grave a threat, If but that \"the\ncombination of these intentions and Soviet military power creates\na very grave danger to the survival of free nations and free insti-\ntutions, a danger which must not be under-estimated.'\nDGA said further: \"No one can guarantee that war will not come.\nThe present crisis is extremely serious. Whether reason will prevail\nis only partly for us to decide. We must hope and strive for the\nbest while we prepare for the worst.\"\nHST in a statement prepared for his press conference on November 30th\nalso stressed that the battlefield situation was uncertain, but said\nthat \"the forces of the UN have no intention of abandoning their\nmission in Korea.\" He continued: \"We have committed ourselves to\nthe cause of a just and peaceful world order through the UN. We\nstand by that commitment. We shall meet the new situation in three\nways. We shall continue to work in the UN for concerted action to\nhalt this aggression in Korea. We shall intensify our efforts to\nhelp other free nations strngthen their defenses in order to meet\nthe threat of aggression elsewhere. We shall rapidly increase our\nown military strength.\"\nHST's Atom\nWhen HST, in answer to questions from the press, said that action\nBomb State-\nin Manchuria would depend on action in the UN and that MacArthur\nment\nwould take whatever steps were necessary to meet the military\nsituation, he was asked whether such steps would include use of the\natom bomb. HST replied that they would include every weapon which\nthe US possessed, and then explained that use of the atom bomb was\nalways under active consideration, but that it was a terrible weapon\nwhich should not be used on innocent persons and was one which he\ndid not want to see used. He said that the selection of targets\nwas a military question and that the military commander in the\nfield, who had charge of the use of weapons, would not have to wait\nfor a specific UN authorization to use the atomic bomb.\nHST's remarks were widely published and commented upon, with some\ninterpretations suggesting that he was giving special emergency\nconsideration to use of the bomb to meet the situation created by\nthe intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea, To clarify\nthe matter, the White House issued a special statement shortly\nafter the press conference. It said:\n\"The President wants to make ti certain that there is no misinter-\npretation of his answers to questions at his press conference\ntoday about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been\nconsideration of this subject since the outbreak of hostilities\nin Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military\nweapons whenever our forces are in combat. Consideration of the\nuse of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that\nweapon.\n(Synopsis D, page 10)\n\"However, it should be emphasized that, by law, only the President\ncan authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization\nhas been given. If and when such authorization should be given,\nthe military commander in the field would have charge of the\ntactical delivery of the weapon. In brief, the replies to the\nquestions at today's press conference do not represent any change\nis\nin this situation. II\nHARRY\nTRUMAH\nAlso on the 30th the Chinse Communist representative told the\nU.S.\nARCHIVES ANDES SERVICE\nLIBRARY\nSecurity Council that although he had stated that he would not\nGOVERNMENT\nparticipate in the discussion of the Korean question along the\nlines being followed by the Council, the US representative had\n\"very strangely\" asked him a number of questions and had \"used a\nthreatening tone.\" He declared that these \"threats\" did not frighten\nhim and that he still refused to discuss \"this so-called complaint.\"\nThe USSR Vetoes\nThe Council rejected, by a vote of 9 to 1, the proposal submitted\nResolution on\nby the Chinese Communist representative and sponsored by the Soviet\nChina\nUnion, which would have condemned the US for armed aggression\nagainst Formosa and Korea, and would have called for the withdrawal\nof the US and \"all other countries\" from Korea. The six-power\ndraft resolution condemning the Chinese Communist intervention in\nKorea, offering reassurances of the peaceful intentions of the UN\ntoward Communist China, and pledging that the Chinese frontier\nwould remain inviolate, was then vetoed by the USSR. The Indian\nrepresentative did not participate in any of the voting, because he\nhad not received instructions from his government.\nDebate in\nAt the opening of a two-debate on foreign policy in the House of\nBritain\nCommons on November 29th, Bevin discussed the Chinese Communist\nintervention in Korea. He said that, without knowing what the\nmotives behind the Chinese action were, he nevertheless felt con-\nvinced that the conflict could be localized if the Communist regime\ndesired it. It was essential, he said, first to stabilize the\nsituation and then to seek a political solution. Bevin told the\nHouse that within the last 24 hours he had been assured by the US\nthat its policy was identical with that of Great Britain, which\nwas \"to resist aggression, to localise the hostilities, and to\nsettle the Korean problem on a basis satisfactory to the UN.\nIn answer to widespread criticism of the action of General MacArthur\nin launching the large-scale offensive against the Chinese, Bevin\nsaid that it was necessary to leave control of operations largely\nin the hands of MacArthur, but assured the House that on plans\ninvolving general policy, there had been \"appropriate consultations.\"\nBevin also maintained that dempite the aggression the British govern-\nment had pursued the only realistic policy in recognizing Communist\nChina, and said that he still believed it should be represented in\nthe UN Security Council.\n(Synopsis D, page 11)\nAt the close of the debate, Attlee announced that he had proposed\nto HST that he fly to Washington to undertake with the President\n\"a wide survey of the problems that face us today.\" It was under-\nstood that Attlee had made this decision after the first and in-\ncorrect reports of HST's statement on the use of the atomic bomb\nhad reached London. These reports were said to have caused con-\nsternation in the House of Commons, and there were demands that\nGreat Britain withdraw its forces from Korea if the US decided to\nuse this weapon. Attlee explained to the House, however, the\nconditions that must be fulfilled in the US before the atomic bomb\ncould be used and he added: \"The British Government consider that\ndecision of such grave import that it could not be taken on behalf\nof the UN without fullest prior consideration with those member\nstates who are at present participating in the international\npolice action.\"\nU.S.\nSERVICES,\nLIBRARY\nGOVERNMENT\nHST Requests\nOn December 1st HST sent a message to Congress in which he requested\nAdditional\nadditional appropriations for defense. The message stated in part:\nAppropriations\n\"The present attack on the UN forces by the Chinese Communists is\na new act of aggression---equally as naked, deliberate, and unpro-\nvoked as the earlier aggression of the North Korean communists\nThere is no conceivable justification for the attack\nThe only ex-\nplanation is that these Chinese have been misled or forced into\ntheir reckless attack--to further the imperialist designs of the\nSoviet Union\nThis aggression casts a more ominous shadow over\nthe prospects for world peace. We see no issue between the Chinese\ncommunists and the free nations, or between the Soviet Union and\nthe free nations which could not be honorably solved by peaceful\nmeans\nThe leaders of communist imperialism could not help but\nknow that this action involved grave risk of world war\nIn the\nface of this situation, the US and the other free nations have no\nchoice but to increase their military strength very rapidly\nWe have not made this choice gladly. But we have made it firmly\nand definitely, and we will not falter or turn back.'\nHST--Attlee\nAttlee arrived in Washington on December 4th and held his first\nTalks\nmeeting with HST. A communiqué issued afterwards said that Bradley\nhad summarized the latest information on the serious military\nsituation in Korea, and that HST and Attlee then reviewed the\ngeneral world situation in the light of these developments.\nAttlee, in an address on December 6th before the National Press\nClub said, in part: \"It is our task here to review the world\nsituation in the light of\n[recent] events and consider carefully\nour further course of action\nWe must always beware of taking\nshort views dictated by our emotions\nWe must always bear in mind\nthat the peoples of the Far East have to live as neighbors and we\nwant them as good neighbors. Our long-term object, therefore, is\nto get ride of the causes of war. That does not mean that we have\nany intention in indulging in what is called appeasement\nI\nam\ntold that there are people who believe that that is what I have\n(Synopsis D, page 12)\ncome here to do. That is not true We in Britain are deeply\nconcerned with all that goes on in Asia, for we have a long and\nintimate association with its peoples\nSo\nwe\nnaturally\nbring\ninto our discussions in Washington the viewpoints we derive from\nour special position.\"\nAlso on the 6th Nehru said that he welcomed the Truman-Attlee\nmeeting and that \"generally speaking,\" the Indians had a \"good\ndeal in common with what [Attlee] has said in regard to the present\nsituation.\" Nehru said that Attlee had been fully acquainted with\nthe Indian point of view in preparation for his talks with HST.\nHST and Attlee held six meetings. A joint communiqué issued at the\nconclusion of their conferences on December 8th stated, in part:\n\"We first reviewed the changed aspect of world affairs arising\nfrom the massive intervention of Chinese communists in Korea\nThe unity of objectives of our two countries underlay all the dis-\ncussions. There is no difference between us as to the nature of\nthe threat which our countries face or the basic policies which\nmust be pursued to overcome it The peoples of the US and the\nUK will act together with resolution and unity to meet the challenge\nto peace which recent weeks have made clear to all\n\"The UN forces were sent into Korea on the authority and at the\nrecommendation of the UN. The UN has not changed the mission which\nit has entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries will\ncontinue to discharge their responsibilities. We were in complete\nagreement that there can be no thought of appeasement or of reward-\nis\nTRUMAN\n\"NATIONAL\ning aggression, whether in the Far East or elsewhere. Lasting\nARCHIVES AND\npeace and the future of the UN as an instrument for world peace\nRECORDS\nLIBRANY\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\ndepend upon strong support for resistance against aggression.\nGOVERNMENT\n\"For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to seek an end\nto the hostilities by means of negotiations. The same principles\nof international conduct should be applied to this situation as are\napplied, in accordance with our obligations under the Charter of\nthe UN, to any threat to world peace. Every effort must be made\nto achieve the purposes of the UN in Korea by peaceful means and\nto find a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of a free\nand independent Korea. We are confident that the great majority\nof the UN takes the same view. If the Chinese on their side\ndisplay any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that\nthe cause of peace can be upheld. If they do not, then it will be\nfor the peoples of the world, acting through the UN, to decide\nhow the principles of the Charter can best be maintained. For\nour part, we declare in advance our firm resolve to uphold them\n\"The free nations of Asia have given strong support to the UN and\nhave worked for world peace. Communist aggression in Korea increases\nthe danger to the security and independence of these nations.\nWe reaffirm our intention to continue to help them.\n(Synopsis D, page 13)\n\"The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions\nwould never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President\ntold the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the\nPrime Minister at all times informed of developments which might\nbring about a change in the situation.\"\nTRUMAN\nDGA met on December 9th with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nLIBRARY\nto give a full summary of the current situation, including a review\nof the talks between Attlee and HST. A joint statement issued\nRECORDS\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nafter the meeting by Connally and Wiley said, in part: \"Since the\ncommuniqué issued following the talks between President Truman\nand Prime Minister Attlee was so complete, there is little that we\nfeel we should add publicly onthat subject at this time. One thing\nthat was clear is that the British and American positions are sub-\nstantially closer than would have appeared a week ago.\"\nKnowland\nAlso on the 9th Knowland said \"I have been greatly shocked by the\nComments\ncommuniqué issued by HST and Attlee\nWhile on its face it indicates\nthat there will be no appeasement, in reading the communiqué through\nit becomes clear that there is the making of a Far Eastern Munich\ncontained in its language\nThere is no clarification given to\nthe status of the existing Republic of Korea, which was set up\nunder UN auspices. The future of Korea is left open to negotiations\nwith the Chinese Communists. Does this mean that ultimately\ndemocratic Korea is going to end up in the same way that a democratic\nPoland ended up as a result of the Yalta conference?\nThere is no\nclear-cut and decisive statement by Attlee and HST that no negotia-\ntions will be carried on as long as a single Chinese Communist\naggressor remains on the soil of Korea. The inference is left\nthat at some point of their own choosing, when the Chinese Com-\nmunists have found they can push no further, we will sit down and\nnegotiate with them, provided they promise not to renew their\naggression. We should have learned by now that the promises of\nthe Soviet Union and its satellites are not worth the paper they\nare printed on.\"\nRhee Comments\nAlso on the 9th Rhee expressed disappointment that the Truman-\nAttlee conference had ended \"without a call for complete mobiliza-\ntion of the democratic world to fight against communism.\" Rhee\nsaid: \"It would have been better if the UN had not helped us at\nall if we are to be abandoned now. There is a real war against\ncommunism in Korea and a potential one in Europe. If the UN forces\nare driven from Korea and the war front is shifted to Europe,\ndemocracy would have a difficult time winning converts anywhere\nin Asia,\"\nComments from\nSoviet views on the meeting were voiced editorially in Pravda on\nMoscow and\nthe 11th, as follows: \"The communiqué does not testify that the\nPeiping\nUS government wants to put an end to the aggression it undertood\nin Korea. On the contrary, Truman and Attlee have come to agree-\nS\nTRUMAN\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\n(Synopsis D, page 14)\nU.S. GOVERNMENT\nSERVICE\"\nment to continue this hopeless adventure If The first reaction\nfrom Peiping came on the 13th with the broadcast of an editorial\nwhich said, in part: \"Truman and Attlee indicated their aggressive\nforces would ignore the appeal of the people of the entire world\nfor the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and would\ncontinue to remain in Korea. Because of this, the Chinese\npeople's volunteers' army will continue to exert their untiring\neffort to deal the enemy heavy blows in order to force the enemy\nto\nwithdraw his spear of aggression.\"\nDevelopments\nWith UN military reverses in Korea and the increasingly critical\nin Congress\ninternational situation as a background, on December 15th House\nRepublicans, meeting in a party conference, adopted by voice vote\na resolution expressing lack of confidence in DGA and asking for\nhis removal from office. It was reported that among the 125\nRepresemtatives voting, only about a dozen dissenting votes were\ncast. The resolution stated:\n\"In this critical hour, confidence of the American people in their\nleadership is essential to our security. It is completely obvious\nthat Secretary Acheson and the State Department under his leadership\nhave lost the confidence of the Congress and the American people\nand cannot regain it. Recognizing this fact, we earnestly insist\nfor the good of our country that Mr. Acheson be replaced as Secretary\nof State, that there be a thorough housecleaning in the State Depart-\nment, and changes in personnel and policies responsible for this\nlack of confidence.\"\nImmediately afterwards, Senate Republicans approved (23 to 5) the\nsame resolution, adding to it the following paragraph: \"We pledge\nour fullest cooperation with the President and the administration\nin a united effort to meet by the most effective means the present\nnational crisis. For this effort there must be national cooperation\nin substance as well as in form, in fact as well as in name.\"\nOn the 18th the Senate debated a resolution directing HST to make\na detailed accounting to the Congress of his discussion with Attlee\nand to make no agreement except in the form of a treaty. During\nthe debate Fulbright accused the Republicans of attempting to dictate\npolicy by \"character assassination,\" and Brewster said that his\nparty had shown \"considerable moderation\" in waiting as long as\nit had to launch its attack on foreign policy. The Senate defeated\nthe resolution by a vote of 47 to 29.\nHST Defends\nAt his press conference on the 19th HST issued a formal statement\nDGA\nrejecting the demands for the dismissal of DGA. He declared:\n\"How our position in the world would be improved by the retirement\nof Dean Acheson from public life is beyond me. Mr. Acheson has\nhelped shape and carry out our policy of resistance to Communist\nimperialism. From the time of our sharing arms with Greece and\nTurkey nearly four years ago, and coming down to the recent moment\nis\nTRUMAN\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\n(Synopsis D, page 15)\nSERVICE\"\n0.8. GOVERNMENT\nwhen he advised me to resist the Communist invasion of South\nKorea, no official in our government has been more alive to\ncommunism's threat to freedom or more forceful in resisting it. If\nHST likened the attacks against DGA to the action of Republicans\nduring Lincoln's administration asking for the dismissal of\nSecretary of State Seward. He said: \"If I were to dismiss\nSecretary Acheson] it would weaken the firm and vigorous position\nthis country has taken against Communist aggression.\" He then\nappealed to persons attacking US foreign policy to suggest any\nalternative policy that they might have to offer. HST concluded:\n\"This is a time of great peril. It is a time for making use of the\ngreat talents of men like Dean Acheson. Communism-not our own\ncountry--would be served by losing him.\"\nThe next day Hoover began the great debate."
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