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SERVICE
(Synopsis E, page 5)
MacArthur's
On January 10 MacArthur replied to the JCS message as follows
Gloomy Mes-
(Hearings, p. 906):
sage of
January 9
Personal for JCS. This refers to your message of January 9.
Clarification requested of your directive in the light of its
qualified requirements that (1) I continue to defend in suc-
cessive positions subject to my basic mission of protecting
Japan and to primary consideration of the safety of my troops;
and (2) that if in my judgment it becomes evident that evacuation
is essential to avoid severe loss of materiel and men that I with-
draw from Korea to Japan.
"In view of the self-evident fact that as presently constituted
Airlish
my command is of strength insufficient to hold a position in
Korea and protect simultaneously Japan against external assault,
strategic dispositions taken in the present situation must be
based upon overriding political policy establishing the relativity
of American interests in the Far East. That a beachhead line can
be held by our existing forces for a limited time in Korea, there
is no doubt, but this could not be accomplished without losses.
Whether or not such losses were regarded as 'severe', would to a
certain extent depend upon the connotation one gives the term.
The command was committed to the Korean campaign to fight the
North Korean invasion army which in due course was effectively
destroyed. It was not the intent that it engage the armies of
the Chinese nation and had there been foreseeable prospects
that it would find it necessary to do so in its own defense,
doubtless it would not have been committed at all. The troops
are embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely
condemned their fighting qualities and courage in misunderstood
retrograde maneuver, are tired from a long and difficult campaign,
and unless the political basis upon which they are asked to trade
life for time is clearly delineated, fully understood, and so
impelling that the hazards of battle are accepted cheerfully,
their morale will become a serious threat to their battle efficiency.
?
"I am in full agreement, as I stated in my message of December 30
in reply to your message of the same date, with your estimate that
the conditions and limitations, namely: no reinforcements, no
measures permissible against China's continental military potential,
continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist military action,
and the concentration in the Korean-Manchurian sector of China's
military force, will eventually render untenable the military
position of the command in Korea. In the absence of overriding
political considerations, under these conditions the command should
be withdrawn from the peninsula just as rapidly as it is feasible
tactically to do so. If, on the other hand, the primary political
interests of the US in the Far East lies in holding a position in
Korea and thus pinning down a large segment of the Chinese military
potential, the military course is implicit in political policy and
we should be prepared to accept any attendant hazard to Japan's
security and whatever casualties result.
The issue involves a decision of highest national and international
importance, far above the competence of a theater commander guided
largely by incidents affecting the tactical situation developing
upon a very limited field of action, and really boils down to the
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"ocrText": "S.\nus.\nSERVICE\n(Synopsis E, page 5)\nMacArthur's\nOn January 10 MacArthur replied to the JCS message as follows\nGloomy Mes-\n(Hearings, p. 906):\nsage of\nJanuary 9\nPersonal for JCS. This refers to your message of January 9.\nClarification requested of your directive in the light of its\nqualified requirements that (1) I continue to defend in suc-\ncessive positions subject to my basic mission of protecting\nJapan and to primary consideration of the safety of my troops;\nand (2) that if in my judgment it becomes evident that evacuation\nis essential to avoid severe loss of materiel and men that I with-\ndraw from Korea to Japan.\n\"In view of the self-evident fact that as presently constituted\nAirlish\nmy command is of strength insufficient to hold a position in\nKorea and protect simultaneously Japan against external assault,\nstrategic dispositions taken in the present situation must be\nbased upon overriding political policy establishing the relativity\nof American interests in the Far East. That a beachhead line can\nbe held by our existing forces for a limited time in Korea, there\nis no doubt, but this could not be accomplished without losses.\nWhether or not such losses were regarded as 'severe', would to a\ncertain extent depend upon the connotation one gives the term.\nThe command was committed to the Korean campaign to fight the\nNorth Korean invasion army which in due course was effectively\ndestroyed. It was not the intent that it engage the armies of\nthe Chinese nation and had there been foreseeable prospects\nthat it would find it necessary to do so in its own defense,\ndoubtless it would not have been committed at all. The troops\nare embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely\ncondemned their fighting qualities and courage in misunderstood\nretrograde maneuver, are tired from a long and difficult campaign,\nand unless the political basis upon which they are asked to trade\nlife for time is clearly delineated, fully understood, and so\nimpelling that the hazards of battle are accepted cheerfully,\ntheir morale will become a serious threat to their battle efficiency.\n?\n\"I am in full agreement, as I stated in my message of December 30\nin reply to your message of the same date, with your estimate that\nthe conditions and limitations, namely: no reinforcements, no\nmeasures permissible against China's continental military potential,\ncontinued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist military action,\nand the concentration in the Korean-Manchurian sector of China's\nmilitary force, will eventually render untenable the military\nposition of the command in Korea. In the absence of overriding\npolitical considerations, under these conditions the command should\nbe withdrawn from the peninsula just as rapidly as it is feasible\ntactically to do so. If, on the other hand, the primary political\ninterests of the US in the Far East lies in holding a position in\nKorea and thus pinning down a large segment of the Chinese military\npotential, the military course is implicit in political policy and\nwe should be prepared to accept any attendant hazard to Japan's\nsecurity and whatever casualties result.\nThe issue involves a decision of highest national and international\nimportance, far above the competence of a theater commander guided\nlargely by incidents affecting the tactical situation developing\nupon a very limited field of action, and really boils down to the"
}