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(Synopsis E, page 6)
question of whether or not the US intends to evacuate Korea.
Nor is it a decision which should be left to the initiative of
enemy action which would in effect be the determining criterion
under a reasonable interpretation of your message. Therefore
my query amounts to this: Is it the present objective of US
political policy to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it
the
can be accomplished, or to maintain a military position in
Korea---indefinitely, for a limited time?
"Under the extraordinary limitations and conditions imposed upon
the command in Korea, as I have pointed out, its military position
a BAN
is untenable, but it can hold, if overriding political considerations
so dictate, for any length of time up to its complete destruction.
Your clarification requested."
S.
U.S.
RECORDS
AND
SERVICET
Washington
Bradley continues the story (p. 736-7) "On January 10th General
Responds
MacArthur came in with. rather a gloomy message [above]. The
Chiefs proposed an answer to that, and it was discussed with the
Department of State and they wanted to put certain political
reasons also in this directive. The JCS objected to that. It
ended up in a discussion at the White House with the President,
and the decision was made that the military part of this dis-
cussion would be pulled out and sent as a directive to General
MacArthur, and the State Department would prepare with the
President a letter on political policy which he would send
separately. So, the military part of that was pulled out and sent
in the directive of January the 12th. The political part was
pulled out and fixed up with the President, and he sent it under
his signature on the 13th. [ The military directive] directed
him to defend in successive positions if necessary, and always
with the understanding that the security of his troops was paramount.
That is in brief form what it was. [paraphrase provided at bottom
of p. 737.] It told him, as I say, to defend in successive
positions; in other words, to stay in Korea. In addition to that,
we were so concern ed with the situation as painted in General
MacArthur's wire of January 10 that two of the Chiefs, General
Collins and General Vandenberg, left on the evening of the 12th,
right after we had cleared the directive and went to Japan and
on into Korea to see for themselves just what the situation was.
Fortunately, about that time the situation began to improve,
and from then on the position was stabilized and we even started
back."
On January 20th MacArthur issued a statement during a tour of the
Korean front: "No one is going to drive us into the sea. This
command intends to maintain a military position in Korea just as
long as the statesmen of the UN decide we should do so."
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"ocrText": "(Synopsis E, page 6)\nquestion of whether or not the US intends to evacuate Korea.\nNor is it a decision which should be left to the initiative of\nenemy action which would in effect be the determining criterion\nunder a reasonable interpretation of your message. Therefore\nmy query amounts to this: Is it the present objective of US\npolitical policy to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it\nthe\ncan be accomplished, or to maintain a military position in\nKorea---indefinitely, for a limited time?\n\"Under the extraordinary limitations and conditions imposed upon\nthe command in Korea, as I have pointed out, its military position\na BAN\nis untenable, but it can hold, if overriding political considerations\nso dictate, for any length of time up to its complete destruction.\nYour clarification requested.\"\nS.\nU.S.\nRECORDS\nAND\nSERVICET\nWashington\nBradley continues the story (p. 736-7) \"On January 10th General\nResponds\nMacArthur came in with. rather a gloomy message [above]. The\nChiefs proposed an answer to that, and it was discussed with the\nDepartment of State and they wanted to put certain political\nreasons also in this directive. The JCS objected to that. It\nended up in a discussion at the White House with the President,\nand the decision was made that the military part of this dis-\ncussion would be pulled out and sent as a directive to General\nMacArthur, and the State Department would prepare with the\nPresident a letter on political policy which he would send\nseparately. So, the military part of that was pulled out and sent\nin the directive of January the 12th. The political part was\npulled out and fixed up with the President, and he sent it under\nhis signature on the 13th. [ The military directive] directed\nhim to defend in successive positions if necessary, and always\nwith the understanding that the security of his troops was paramount.\nThat is in brief form what it was. [paraphrase provided at bottom\nof p. 737.] It told him, as I say, to defend in successive\npositions; in other words, to stay in Korea. In addition to that,\nwe were so concern ed with the situation as painted in General\nMacArthur's wire of January 10 that two of the Chiefs, General\nCollins and General Vandenberg, left on the evening of the 12th,\nright after we had cleared the directive and went to Japan and\non into Korea to see for themselves just what the situation was.\nFortunately, about that time the situation began to improve,\nand from then on the position was stabilized and we even started\nback.\"\nOn January 20th MacArthur issued a statement during a tour of the\nKorean front: \"No one is going to drive us into the sea. This\ncommand intends to maintain a military position in Korea just as\nlong as the statesmen of the UN decide we should do so.\""
}