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Fn DC TROWHY KOREA - Synopsis G: Miscellaneous Developments, (Page 1) ARCHIVES SERVICE" RECORDS 'NATIONAL AND February-June, 1951 The 38th Parallel As the line of battle became stabilized and the initiative passed Again back to UN forces in February, the question of crossing the 38th parallel again became a public issue. On February 2nd the State Department issued a statement in response to published reports that Great Britain strongly opposed a recross- ing of the 38th parallel in Korea by UN forces, and that the US government also favored the halting of UN troops at the old boundary. The statement said: "The present mission of the UN forces in Korea is to repel the aggression and restore international peace and security in the area. Repelling the aggression is a military mission which will be vigorously pressed. The restoration of peace in the area is before the UN; the process would not be helped by speculation about the 38th Parallel at this time. " A spokesman of the British Foreign Office said on the same day that the British government would want a full discussion among all nations having troops in Korea before any new decision was made on crossing the 38th parallel, but he declined to say whether this question had been a specific point of discussion with the US. Attlee Comments On February 12th Attlee told the House of Commons that it was the British view that the 38th parallel "should not be crossed again until there had been full consultations with the UN and in par- ticular with those member states that were contributing forces in Korea. " He said that it had to be remembered, however, "that this was in no sense a military line and in deciding the line account would have to be taken of military considerations. Attlee said that the US already had been informed of this view and had met the suggestion with the "fullest comprehension of the political implications involved in crossing the 38th parallel. " Also on the 12th, in reply to inquiries about crossing the parallel, a spokesman of the State Department said that the US had the matter "under consideration and. [was] consulting other governments about it. " MacArthur MacArthur expressed his views in a statement issued on the 13th, Comments following an inspection tour of the western front in Korea. The statement said, in part: "What the future has in store in Korea continues to be largely dependent upon international considera- tions, and decisions not yet known here. Meanwhile, the command head. . is doing everything that could reasonably be expected of it. Our field strategy, initiated upon Communist China's entry into the war, involving a rapid withdrawal to lengthen the enemy's supply lines with resultant pyramiding of his logistical difficulties and an almost astronomical increase in the destruc- tiveness of our air power, has worked well. In the development of this strategy the 8th Army has achieved local tactical

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    "ocrText": "Fn DC\nTROWHY\nKOREA - Synopsis G: Miscellaneous Developments,\n(Page 1)\nARCHIVES SERVICE\" RECORDS 'NATIONAL AND\nFebruary-June, 1951\nThe 38th Parallel As the line of battle became stabilized and the initiative passed\nAgain\nback to UN forces in February, the question of crossing the 38th\nparallel again became a public issue.\nOn February 2nd the State Department issued a statement in response\nto published reports that Great Britain strongly opposed a recross-\ning of the 38th parallel in Korea by UN forces, and that the US\ngovernment also favored the halting of UN troops at the old\nboundary. The statement said: \"The present mission of the UN\nforces in Korea is to repel the aggression and restore international\npeace and security in the area. Repelling the aggression is a\nmilitary mission which will be vigorously pressed. The restoration\nof peace in the area is before the UN; the process would not be\nhelped by speculation about the 38th Parallel at this time. \"\nA spokesman of the British Foreign Office said on the same day\nthat the British government would want a full discussion among all\nnations having troops in Korea before any new decision was made\non crossing the 38th parallel, but he declined to say whether\nthis question had been a specific point of discussion with the US.\nAttlee Comments\nOn February 12th Attlee told the House of Commons that it was the\nBritish view that the 38th parallel \"should not be crossed again\nuntil there had been full consultations with the UN and in par-\nticular with those member states that were contributing forces\nin Korea. \" He said that it had to be remembered, however, \"that\nthis was in no sense a military line and in deciding the line\naccount would have to be taken of military considerations.\nAttlee said that the US already had been informed of this view\nand had met the suggestion with the \"fullest comprehension of\nthe political implications involved in crossing the 38th parallel. \"\nAlso on the 12th, in reply to inquiries about crossing the\nparallel, a spokesman of the State Department said that the US\nhad the matter \"under consideration and. [was] consulting\nother governments about it. \"\nMacArthur\nMacArthur expressed his views in a statement issued on the 13th,\nComments\nfollowing an inspection tour of the western front in Korea. The\nstatement said, in part: \"What the future has in store in Korea\ncontinues to be largely dependent upon international considera-\ntions, and decisions not yet known here. Meanwhile, the command\nhead. .\nis doing everything that could reasonably be expected of it.\nOur field strategy, initiated upon Communist China's entry into\nthe war, involving a rapid withdrawal to lengthen the enemy's\nsupply lines with resultant pyramiding of his logistical\ndifficulties and an almost astronomical increase in the destruc-\ntiveness of our air power, has worked well. In the development\nof this strategy the 8th Army has achieved local tactical"
}