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2/13/54, Reel 5, Track 1, Pas 3 with these notes tonight. If there is a_ny discussion, or questions about where we are, we might take a little while to talk about it. DR. OPPENHEIMER: Was this Chinese intervention regarded as a serious token of a danger of spreading war all over? I remember that it was during this period that the air alerts kept coming in, and certainly there was lots and lots of talk about among many of the officers in the Pentagon indicating that they thought the bottom had fallen out of everything and that war on a global scale was almost certain to occur. MR. ACHESON: What do you remember about that, Paul? MR. NITZE: 0h, this was debated and discussed in and out, in and out. This was really VATHINAL the background of the whole issue, and I think the JointFhiefs were perfectly us. and clear that they did not want to see the war spread. They were in no shape for a war with the U.S.S.R., certainly, and that they really were in no shape really for an extension of the war to China, -- ^ DI. OPPENHEIMER: I meant a spread of the war not by our action, but a spread of the war by the enemy action. MR. NITZE: I think everybody was nervous about what attack might hit you some place else whether they might go on to attack Formosa, whether they might increase pres- you sure in Indochina, whether they might go after Yugoslavia -- we feltyourselves pretty well threatened all the way around; we felt awfully weak after the disaster. MR. ACHESON: It was at this time, as we mentioned earlier, that the air force radar in resomewhere Nor th Canada picked up some ice formationswhich they thought were a bomber formation coming south which created a lot of excitement. DR. OPPENHEIMER: They p icked up our own bombers coming back from England. MR. ACHESON: I thought it was an ice formation. DR. OPPENHEIMER: There was more thanone incident. MR. NITZE: I think there was also a conversation of the Russian Ambassador to Peiping

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    "ocrText": "2/13/54, Reel 5, Track 1, Pas\n3\nwith these notes tonight. If there is a_ny discussion, or questions about\nwhere we are, we might take a little while to talk about it.\nDR.\nOPPENHEIMER: Was this Chinese intervention regarded as a serious token of a danger of\nspreading war all over? I remember that it was during this period that the\nair alerts kept coming in, and certainly there was lots and lots of talk about\namong many of the officers in the Pentagon indicating that they thought the\nbottom had fallen out of everything and that war on a global scale was almost\ncertain to occur.\nMR. ACHESON:\nWhat do you remember about that, Paul?\nMR. NITZE:\n0h, this was debated and discussed in and out, in and out. This was really\nVATHINAL\nthe background of the whole issue, and I think the JointFhiefs were perfectly\nus.\nand\nclear that they did not want to see the war spread. They were in no shape\nfor a war with the U.S.S.R., certainly, and that they really were in no shape\nreally\nfor an extension of the war to China, --\n^\nDI. OPPENHEIMER: I meant a spread of the war not by our action, but a spread of the war\nby the enemy action.\nMR. NITZE:\nI think everybody was nervous about what attack might hit you some place else\nwhether they might go on to attack Formosa, whether they might increase pres-\nyou\nsure in Indochina, whether they might go after Yugoslavia -- we feltyourselves\npretty well threatened all the way around; we felt awfully weak after the\ndisaster.\nMR. ACHESON:\nIt was at this time, as we mentioned earlier, that the air force radar in\nresomewhere\nNor th Canada picked up some ice formationswhich they thought were a bomber\nformation coming south which created a lot of excitement.\nDR. OPPENHEIMER: They p icked up our own bombers coming back from England.\nMR. ACHESON:\nI thought it was an ice formation.\nDR. OPPENHEIMER: There was more thanone incident.\nMR. NITZE:\nI think there was also a conversation of the Russian Ambassador to Peiping"
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