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2/13/54, Reel 5, Track 1, Pas
3
with these notes tonight. If there is a_ny discussion, or questions about
where we are, we might take a little while to talk about it.
DR.
OPPENHEIMER: Was this Chinese intervention regarded as a serious token of a danger of
spreading war all over? I remember that it was during this period that the
air alerts kept coming in, and certainly there was lots and lots of talk about
among many of the officers in the Pentagon indicating that they thought the
bottom had fallen out of everything and that war on a global scale was almost
certain to occur.
MR. ACHESON:
What do you remember about that, Paul?
MR. NITZE:
0h, this was debated and discussed in and out, in and out. This was really
VATHINAL
the background of the whole issue, and I think the JointFhiefs were perfectly
us.
and
clear that they did not want to see the war spread. They were in no shape
for a war with the U.S.S.R., certainly, and that they really were in no shape
really
for an extension of the war to China, --
^
DI. OPPENHEIMER: I meant a spread of the war not by our action, but a spread of the war
by the enemy action.
MR. NITZE:
I think everybody was nervous about what attack might hit you some place else
whether they might go on to attack Formosa, whether they might increase pres-
you
sure in Indochina, whether they might go after Yugoslavia -- we feltyourselves
pretty well threatened all the way around; we felt awfully weak after the
disaster.
MR. ACHESON:
It was at this time, as we mentioned earlier, that the air force radar in
resomewhere
Nor th Canada picked up some ice formationswhich they thought were a bomber
formation coming south which created a lot of excitement.
DR. OPPENHEIMER: They p icked up our own bombers coming back from England.
MR. ACHESON:
I thought it was an ice formation.
DR. OPPENHEIMER: There was more thanone incident.
MR. NITZE:
I think there was also a conversation of the Russian Ambassador to Peiping
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"ocrText": "2/13/54, Reel 5, Track 1, Pas\n3\nwith these notes tonight. If there is a_ny discussion, or questions about\nwhere we are, we might take a little while to talk about it.\nDR.\nOPPENHEIMER: Was this Chinese intervention regarded as a serious token of a danger of\nspreading war all over? I remember that it was during this period that the\nair alerts kept coming in, and certainly there was lots and lots of talk about\namong many of the officers in the Pentagon indicating that they thought the\nbottom had fallen out of everything and that war on a global scale was almost\ncertain to occur.\nMR. ACHESON:\nWhat do you remember about that, Paul?\nMR. NITZE:\n0h, this was debated and discussed in and out, in and out. This was really\nVATHINAL\nthe background of the whole issue, and I think the JointFhiefs were perfectly\nus.\nand\nclear that they did not want to see the war spread. They were in no shape\nfor a war with the U.S.S.R., certainly, and that they really were in no shape\nreally\nfor an extension of the war to China, --\n^\nDI. OPPENHEIMER: I meant a spread of the war not by our action, but a spread of the war\nby the enemy action.\nMR. NITZE:\nI think everybody was nervous about what attack might hit you some place else\nwhether they might go on to attack Formosa, whether they might increase pres-\nyou\nsure in Indochina, whether they might go after Yugoslavia -- we feltyourselves\npretty well threatened all the way around; we felt awfully weak after the\ndisaster.\nMR. ACHESON:\nIt was at this time, as we mentioned earlier, that the air force radar in\nresomewhere\nNor th Canada picked up some ice formationswhich they thought were a bomber\nformation coming south which created a lot of excitement.\nDR. OPPENHEIMER: They p icked up our own bombers coming back from England.\nMR. ACHESON:\nI thought it was an ice formation.\nDR. OPPENHEIMER: There was more thanone incident.\nMR. NITZE:\nI think there was also a conversation of the Russian Ambassador to Peiping"
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