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3/14/54: Reel 5, Track 1, Page 1 MR. RUSK: between Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain over this matter, and we let them talk it out because we didn't care too much on our side, although we did say that if Britain came into it the Philippines would have to come into it and certain others; with the result that I mentioned earlier. it was taken up with me by Churchill and Eden. It was MR. ACHESON: As I was a matter of very considerable comment in Parliament, in the press, in British public circles. Our view was, as we had said from the very a start, that we could not have a purely white treaty organization in the GONTR 3 & Pacific. And if we dealt with these islands in the Pacific, that was us something that you could understand; ** we had a treaty with Japan; we had one with Australia; we had one with New Zealand; and that was understandable. But if we were going to get Great Britain, we would have to have France. That got us involved with mainland preconceptions, and it also made it purely European, which we would not do. And this this is became very acrimonious and very bitter. I'm not at all sure that/now any happier. Well, that brings us to the San Francisco Conference, and this had many amusing aspects. DR. OPPENHEIMER: You haven' 't mentioned what the Pentagon wanted that was difficult to arrange. You said that our friends in the Pentagon and our allies were two equally great problems; did.. did they want more space for bases, or... MR. ACHESON: Well, the Pentagon was continually wishing more' ontrol in and over Japan than was possible to maintain, not only during the treaty period but after the treaty period when Dean Rusk went out to work out the administrative agreement. And they wanted rights in Japan, jurisdiction over their troops, power to take over authority in case of crisis, all sorts of actionswhich were quite impossible to retain and accomplish our other purposes in the Far East. MR. RUSK: I think it's fundamentally correct to say that the Pentagon would have