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3/14/54: Reel 1, Track 1, age 9
work out. I do not quite recoll ect why it did not work out; there
was some objection to it; but I know we sent a telegram to Kirk, laying
forth the scheme and then asking his advice as to whether this would
work. I forget whether we ever put it into operation or not. Do you
remember
MR. RUSK:
Yes, I do; and this again has not been made public, although it is recorded
in the Department files. Based on conversations between the State Depart-
ment and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dean Acheson referred to earlier, we
came to the conclusior that we were notwwilling to pay the price that was
involved in going futher north, either to the small neck up at the--in the
middle of North Korea- or to the Yalu, because the-in any event, we would
be faced with a political settlement. We were not prepared to carry the
war through to the point where something like an unconditional surrender
could be obtained where we could settle Korea on our own terms. Having
made that--come to that conclusion, it seemed desirable then to alert your
antenna (?) to find out whether there were ways in which the war could
be brought to a close, and that simply dragged on, with the sacrifices
that were involved. Mr. Kennan has al ready spoken of his talks with Mr.
RELIAN
Malik. It seemed to be desirable to try to establish some sort of con-
versation with Peiping, not only because it might lead to some clues as
U.S.
to the Korean War, but Iso it might lead to some clues as to the rela-
tionship between Peiping and Moscow. It was then pretty much an accepted
policy that our first choice in respect to Peiping was that it fall; but
that our second choice was that, if it didn't fall, it could somehow be
separated from Moscow. We got a rather curious suggestion from a Russian
source, and I don't recall at the moment exactly where; I think Mr. Malik
had something to do with it, that we ought to put ourselves in touch with
the Chinese. Well, we thought that was sufficiently curious to investigate
further, but since Mr. Malik had made the suggestion we thought that we
ought to follow it up under the eyes of the Russians themselves. And so
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"ocrText": "3/14/54: Reel 1, Track 1, age 9\nwork out. I do not quite recoll ect why it did not work out; there\nwas some objection to it; but I know we sent a telegram to Kirk, laying\nforth the scheme and then asking his advice as to whether this would\nwork. I forget whether we ever put it into operation or not. Do you\nremember\nMR. RUSK:\nYes, I do; and this again has not been made public, although it is recorded\nin the Department files. Based on conversations between the State Depart-\nment and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dean Acheson referred to earlier, we\ncame to the conclusior that we were notwwilling to pay the price that was\ninvolved in going futher north, either to the small neck up at the--in the\nmiddle of North Korea- or to the Yalu, because the-in any event, we would\nbe faced with a political settlement. We were not prepared to carry the\nwar through to the point where something like an unconditional surrender\ncould be obtained where we could settle Korea on our own terms. Having\nmade that--come to that conclusion, it seemed desirable then to alert your\nantenna (?) to find out whether there were ways in which the war could\nbe brought to a close, and that simply dragged on, with the sacrifices\nthat were involved. Mr. Kennan has al ready spoken of his talks with Mr.\nRELIAN\nMalik. It seemed to be desirable to try to establish some sort of con-\nversation with Peiping, not only because it might lead to some clues as\nU.S.\nto the Korean War, but Iso it might lead to some clues as to the rela-\ntionship between Peiping and Moscow. It was then pretty much an accepted\npolicy that our first choice in respect to Peiping was that it fall; but\nthat our second choice was that, if it didn't fall, it could somehow be\nseparated from Moscow. We got a rather curious suggestion from a Russian\nsource, and I don't recall at the moment exactly where; I think Mr. Malik\nhad something to do with it, that we ought to put ourselves in touch with\nthe Chinese. Well, we thought that was sufficiently curious to investigate\nfurther, but since Mr. Malik had made the suggestion we thought that we\nought to follow it up under the eyes of the Russians themselves. And so"
}