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OCR Page 1 of 165/1/54 - Reel 6 - track 1, Page 1
MR. NITZE:
This in itself is significant from the State Department standpoint, and
STALMAN
that we don't have any ideas of our own with respect to these British
ARCHINEN& NATIONAL RECORDS ADMING
plans and have them analyzed. I propose to go back and report that
<<s
to the department.
VOICE:
In this stage of the game he brought in all his fellows and we did
set up this series of meetings and they finally terminated with a pre-
sentation by the chief joints of staff at a joint-state JCS meeting.
MR. NITZE:
But the upshot of all this was that the joint chiefs did not believe
that the British plans were realistic, or implementable. So in fact,
you did not have any kind of a program or a target in the long run to
which you were trying to build. In other words, this thing is purely
a political facade, and would on the first day of the meeting of any
planning group under NEDO be SO revealed.
MR. ACHESON:
Now let's examine this idea that this is purely a military concept which
was related to massive retaliation and has no bearing on Middle Eastern
problems. I don't think that's true. Now whether this is right or not
I'm not equipped to know; but I think it has, something like this, has
a great bearing on Middle Eastern problems. Take one illustration at the
outset. The latest thing which we have done in connection with the
Middle East has been this Turkish-Iraque-Pakistan operation. That indicates
the interrelation between military ideas, political ones. This has been
a
very disruptive thing in the Middle East. We have not helped ourselves;
we have hurt ourselves. And dealing with Southeast Asia we are worse
off than we were before and we have created nothing from our effective
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