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OCR Page 1 of 2003598 Handed t Mr. Luke 43
hym.gom Nov. 4,1950.
Berin to
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065
State Dept.
OF us 1950 VOL. III PAGE 1032
HC
2.25 ty
Your telegra
in Korea
I do not favour taking precipitate action to refer
this question to the Security Council. mis might make it
more, rather than loss difficult for the Chinese to climb
down and avoid open commitment. I would have thought that
there was everything to be said for ignoring limited Chinese
intervention.
2.
It is of great importance to establish the military
significance of Chinese intervention. If the unified command
are still confident that their plans can be executed despite
aid from China to the North Koreans then there is everything
to be said politically for not forcing the Chinese into a
position from which they cannot withdrew. If, however,
Chinese intervention gravely projudices the success of the
military campaign (whether this intervention takes the form
of moving in substantial forces or of permitting the use of
Manohurian airfields) then there would be no alternative to
our taking the question to the Security Council. In that
event we would also be in a much stronger position in doing so.
Your telegra under reference indicates that we my soon rach
this position and we are therefore working on a draft resolution
as a possible basis for discussion in the first instance with
the State Department.
s.
the Lines on which we are thinking are that the resolution
whist 10 condoms Chinese intervention and calls on thea to
withdrew at the - the should
(a) Receil the terms of the General Assembly Resolution
of October 9th an witch United Nations policy has been mas
olser
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