Memorandum of Conversation

124 DECLASSIFIED 3-102 State Dept. E.O. 12065, Guidelines, NLT, Sec. Date March 4.21.47 6, 1982 UNITED STATES MISSION CONFIDENTIAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS US/S/1580 November 21, 1950 BY He MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION November 21, 1950 SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Representatives PARTICIPANTS: B. L. Sharma, Indian Delegation David Wainhouse, U.S. Delegation Ray Thurston, U S. Delegation (separate conversation) Mr. Sharma took me aside this afternoon and said the matter of how to deal effectively with the Chinese Communist representatives had been giving his delegation concern. The question, he said, is important because the suc- cess or failure of finding a solution to Chinese intervention in Korea might turn upon the way this delicate matter is handled. What must be avoided in the Security Council, he felt, is a head-on collision between the parties by extreme statements from which it would not be easy for them to retreat. He felt certain that the Soviets would manouver the debate in the Security Council in a manner which would in a sense commit the Chinese Communist representatives to a course of action the Chinese them- selves would be obliged to follow. Since the Soviet aim is to drive deeper the wedge between the United States and the Peiping regime the Soviet repre- sentative in the Security Council would be more pro-Chinese Red than would the Chinese Communists themselves. It has occurred to his delegation that one way of preventing a head-on collision would be the appointment of a Security Council Committee of the six non-permanent members for the purpose of considering all proposals that have been made or may be made in connection with the restoration of peace in Korea and of preventing the conflict from spreading. The Chinese Communist repre- sentatives would, of course, appear and participate in the Committee's delib- erations. Mr. Sharma felt that such a Committee would provide a way of avoiding a head-on collision. It would also tend to keep the parties from taking extreme positions and would isolate the Chinese representatives from the Big Five. The atmosphere in such a Committee would be a conciliatory one and the Chinese representatives might feel freer to talk. He stressed the importance of no publicity being given to the work of this Committee. No one would talk for home consumption or to the galleries. Mr. Sharma handed me what he described as a rough draft for the setting up of a Security Council Committee of the six non-permanent members. (The draft is attached hereto.) There may be "bugs" in the idea, he said, but he wanted our reaction to it nevertheless. I told him I would bring this matter to the attention of my delegation, and he asked when he might have our re- action. I replied, as soon as possible, probably not for a day or two. He commented that it was important to act promptly. Mr. Sharma went on to say that his delegation is not going to "chase" after the Chinese Communist Delegation; that his Delegation had asked its Mission in Prague to send on whatever information it picks up about the Chinese Com- munist Delegation there. He said that it would not surprise him if the 14622 CONFIDENTIAL