Memorandum from David Popper

UNP-CAM 66 a Mr. Nolting April 24, 1951 UNP - Mr. Popper Status of Negotiations on Our Program for Economic Action in the Additional Measures Committee This is in response to your telephone inquiry OR this subject this afternoon. Even before the passage of the General Assembly Resolution of February 1, which condenned the Chinese Communists for engaging in aggression in Korea, we had begun to consider what additional measures we might take to cope with that aggression. Our telegram no. 643 to New York dated January 20 not forth the measures we contemplate in the political as well as the economic field. Since that time we have worked out in considerable detail the selective embargo proposal which we are now pressing upon friendly governments in the United Nations. This has involved weeks of effort within the Department and in negotiations with Commerce, Treasury and Defense to reach agreement on a program which we could put across in the General Assembly. As you will recall, we subjected our general relations with the United Kingdom to considerable strain in the course of our efforts to gain.British approval of the February 1 Resolution. In order to improve the prospects for future action, we therefore instructed New York in our 684 of February 2 not to consult on our program for additional measures with other delegations until we had had further consultations with the United Kingdom. These consul- tations took place, first in Washington and later in New York, at a very slow pace because of the admitted British unwillingness to to anything whatever in this field. Indeed, the British and French as recently as yesterday reiterated in New York their opposition to even our limited economic program. Their feeling is that, since the COCOM countries are already applying a selective embargo privately, the United States' proposal would have no additional effect on the Chinese Communists warmaking potential, and that it would be psycho- logically unwise because it would prejudice the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. The British view is that we should avoid all additional measures until the GOC set up under the February 1 Resolution has failed, even though the reso- lution says only that the AMC is authorized to defer its report to the General Assembly if the GOC reports satisfactory progress. We have argued that if our economic program had any effect on the Chinese Communists, it would increase their willingness to negotiate rather than diminish it. We have not, however, moved the British on this point. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 In State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979 SECRET By NLISK NARS, 245