Statement by Ambassador Ernest Gross

DECLASSIFIED XXX IDENTIAL 100 E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 US/A/Ac.52/28 State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 10-28-H 1979 UNITED STATES MISSION May 3, 1951 TO THE UNITED NATIONS He NARS, Date May 3, 1951 By NLT- STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR ERNEST A. GROSS, IN the ADDITIONAL MEASURES COMMITTEE Mr. Chairman, The business before us today is the report of our Subcommittee. In that report the Subcommittee unanimously recommended that when the full Additional Measures Committee took up again the examination of additional measures to repulse the aggression in Korea it should give priority to the study of economic measures. At our meeting on February 15 I suggested that the task of this Subcommittee would be to devise a program of additional measures which would give support to the forces of the United Nations and help in bringing about genuine negotiation and peaceful settlement. The numerous consultations and exchanges of view which are mentioned in the Subcommittee's report showed that, of the whole range of possible additional measures, economic measures could be most speodily agreed to and most effectively applied. Let me recall briefly what the United States itself has done in its economic relations with the Chinese Communists. As things now stand, we license no goods for export to Communist China, we prohibit our ships and planes from calling at its ports or carrying goods which are destined for Communist China, and we have frozen Chinese Communist assets within the United States. We believe that this is a sound policy. We believe that it is in the interest of ponce and of collective security and therefore is in the interest of all ponce-loving nations. Several members of this Committee have already taken concrete steps in this field to support the United Nations effort to weaken the capacity of the Chinese Communists to continue their aggression in Korea. For example, the Philippines has imposed a complete embargo on trade with Communist China. Australia has imposed 7. strategic embargo. Our colleague, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, pointed out last month in San Francisco that the United Kingdom does not per- mit the export of arms, munitions or strategic goods to the Chinese Communist Government, whose troops are fighting against United Nations forces. I stress the fact that these are examples. I hope that as our work goos on we shall keep in mind the potential advantages of a full embargo as an instrument which may help us achieve our purposes in Korea. Such an undertaking, of course, presents complex economic issues and administrative problems which are not to be worked out in a day or a week, as our consultations have abundantly shown. The effectiveness of economic measures depends on two factors: first, what the measures are; second, how widely the measures are adopted. In the view of my government, it will be more effective if most of us agree now to a strategic embargo rather than having a smaller number of us agree to a complete embargo. The United States therefore urges a program which can be immediately and effectively applied on the widest possible scale. The United States is strongly of the opinion that this Committee should recommend to the Gen ral Assembly the imposition by all states of an embargo on the shipment of war materials to Communist China. We have in mind a formula which would call for the embargo of shipments to Communist China of arms, ammunition and implements of war; petroleum; atomic energy materials; and items useful in the production of arms, ammunitions and implements of war. These are items which would be of immediate consequence on the Korean battlefield. To cite only one example, the denial of petroleum to the Chinese Communist armies would have a serious effect on their mobility. We believe the formula should be flexible: therefore, we suggest that this Committee recommend to the General Assembly that each state determine for itself what specific commodities it would embargo under this formula, and what controls each stato would apply to make the embargo effective. We believe further that the resolution should recommend that each state would undertake not to nullify, through trans-shipment, re-export, or enlargement of its volume of trade, the effectiveness of the embargoes on commodities applied by other complying states. 506