Telegram from Ambassador William Sebald to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

13 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State NATIONAL ARCHIVES RECORDS AND SERVICE" b.g COMPANY TELEGRAPH BRANCH PLAIN A Action Control: 11784 Rec'd: March 24, 1951 FROM: Tokyo 5:48 a.m. TO: Secretary of State C E NO: 1704, March 24 P SAM EUR Following text statement "on military situation in Korea" UNA issued by General MacArthur prior departure March 24 for OLI Korean battlefront: CIA IE "Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We PA have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized DCR Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his opera- tions. This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics have definite- ly failed him as our own forces have become seasoned to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are but contribu- ting to his piecemeal losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under the rigors of climate, terrain and battle "of even greater significence than our tactical successes has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war. He lacks the manu- facturing base and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and NA he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground opera- tions, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offsetthe vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies. Control of the sea and the 4 air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past. When this control exists as in our case, and is CPE coupled with andinferi or of ground fire power as in the enemy's case, sult issa ty uc that it cannot be overcome by Cabate 1, of the most gross indifference to human loss. Meseage Cente"These PLAIN REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED