Document
Telegram from Allan Lightner to Secretary of State Dean Acheson
- Part of Korean War Files (Truman Administration), Department of State Files
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 2INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
RE
I
TELEGRAPH BRANCH
18-H-X
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
Action
Control: 2009
FE
Rec'd:
June 5, 1952
FROM: Pusan
11:33 .m.
Info
SS
TO:
Secretary of State
G
UNA
NO: 1292, June 5, 7 p.m.
USUN
SAM
P
NIACT
I
DCR
Situation on eve Ambassador's return is summarized as follows:
DCRM
Pres Rhee shows no signs weakening on major issues. Last-
minute decision postpone dissolution of Assembly gives us few
days additional breathing spell but his public announcement
last night warning opposition Assemblymen to give in or face
dissolution of Assembly shows his backdown on June 3 was
temporary lapse. His statements to Plimsoll June 5 also show
his determination to go ahead at all costs.
Prime Minister whose role in present conflict still has us
slightly baffled, appears to be doing his best to stand by
Assemblymen. However he does not speak directly for opposition
group although up to now his views seem to be parallel to theirs.
The point is he is extremely anxious to come out on winning
side and may well withdraw his support of Assembly group when
he convinced game is up. Assembly group wld not necessarily
capitulate that moment but loss of PM's support wld be major blow
and might well shatter opposition's unity and stamina.
I saw PM again last night at Van Fleet's dinner for Sulzberger
party and he reiterated point mentioned in EMBTEL 1268 June 4
that diplomatic notes and expressions of concern wld not deter
Rhee and unless some assurance giver that US/UN wld do what was
necessary to come to rescue of constitutional govt, it might be
better for Assemblymen to capitulate now rather than later.
He
described in detail harrowing effects of present "terror"; many
Assemblymen unable visit homes which preiodically searched are
their growing fears for lives and welfare of their families. IM
said no one wanted give in but if Rhee's triumph inevitable many
lives might be saved by recognizing this fact now. He seemed
to feel that nothing short of US/UN assurances cld prevent Rhee
victory.
Muccio cld not be arriving more propitious moment, assuming be
will have instructions and policy guidance required to meet sit-
uation described above. Issues have been very clear for past 10
days and cannot be ducked by optimistic reliance on further ex-
pressions of great concern or frank disapproval. Rhee has one-
track
69
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