Telegram from President Harry S. Truman to Prime Minister Winston Churchill

NLT-292 IAD DECLASSIFIED by authority of State Dept lbt to NANS 8-10-72 IOP SLORET NL memo to NLT 11 MAY 1945 PRIORITY 4-12-13 FROM: OPNAV Initials BK2Dits 5/21/74 5810 TO : ALUSNA, LONDON 120015Z NCR S. NUMBER 34, PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE us AND PRIME MINISTER. Since sending you my telegram of April 30 I have become increasingly concerned over the implication of Tito's actions in Venezia Giulia. You are no doubt receiving the same reports which indicate that he has no in- tention of abandoning the territory or of permitting a peaceful solution of this century old problem as part of a general pacific post-war settlement. I have come to the conclusion that we must decide now whether we should uphold the fundamental principles of territorial settlement by orderly process against force, intimidation or blackmail. It seems that Tito has an identical claim ready for South Austria, in Carinthia and Styria and may have similar designs on parts of Hungary and Greece if his methods in Venezia Giulia succeed. Although the stability of Italy and the future orientation of that country with respect to Russia may well bé at stake the present issue, as I see it, is not a question of taking sides in a dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia or of becoming involved in internal Balkan politics. The problem is essentially one of deciding whether our two coun- tries are going to permit our Allies to engage in uncontrolled land grabbing or tactics which are all too reminiscent of those of Hitler and Japan. Yugo- slav occupation of Trieste, the key to that area and a vital outlet for large areas of central Europe, would, as I know you will agree, have more far-reaching consequences than the immediate territory involved. In these circumstances