Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Noval Aide) 365 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON State Depl. E.O. 12065, DECLASSIFIED cuidelines, NLT, Sec. March 3-402 op 129-85 6, SECRET 1982 SECURITY INFORMA TION- June 16, 1952 DEB SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN During a discussion of Iranian financial and political matters, the Shah told Ambassador Henderson of his dilemma concerning the dismissal of Prime Minister Mosadeq. Much depended, the Shah thought, on the outcome of the oil case before the International Court of Justice. If Mosadeq, representing Iran, won the decision that the Court did not possess jurisdiction, he would be a hero and his removal would be dangerous. If, on the other hand, the Court decided against Iran, Mosadeq might resign or could be dismissed. However, even in the latter case, the Shah foresaw great risks unless a new Iranian government could be assured of immediate financial aid from the United States or the United Kingdom. Moreover, an oil agreement would have to be reached within the framework of Iran's na- tionalization laws if a new government were to survive. Could he also be assured, asked the Shah, that the British would not try to drive an im- - possible bargain with a new government? Henderson told the Shah that the United States could not be ex- pected to give any firm advance assurances of financial assistance. How- ever, Henderson believed that US attitudes would be favorably impressed by a new Iranian government's taking energetic efforts to find a fair solution to the oil dispute and to improve its relations with the United Kingdom. If this were done, Henderson said, he was convinced that the American public and the Congress would not like to see such a government fall merely be - cause it could not obtain temporary financial aid. With respect to the Shah's concern over the bargaining attitude of the British toward a new government, Henderson urged the Shah frankly to discuss his concern with the present British representative in Tehran. EGYPT Ambassador Gifford in London has informed us that it would be a mistake to underestimate the strength of British feeling against the recognition of the Egyptian King's title as King of the Sudan without the voluntary concurrence of the Sudanese. The British regard this primarily as a matter of principle but are concerned as well with the effect that recognizing the title would have on British authority in Africa. Foreign Secretary Eden indicated to Gifford and Assistant Secretary Byroade that his government could fall on this question and Gifford reports that wide Labor opposition, a "Sudan lobby" of Conservative back-benchers, and the TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION