Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 June 30,1952 State DEB NLT, Date 12-29-85 Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By. SECRET SECURITY INFORMMATION (AFFERY SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT The resignation of Egyptian Prime Minister Hilali Pasha has been accepted and Hussein Sirry Pasha has been asked to form a new government. Ambassador Stevenson refused to intervene with the King to prevent Hilali's resignation in view of the responsibility that we would have incurred for a successful outcome of Hilali's negotiations over the Sudan. Stevensor saw no reason to believe that the British contemplated the concessions necessary for such success. In fact he stated that the Hilali Government's weakness resulted from its inability to accomplish anything with-the British in face of the fact that the country believed its appointment was welcomed by the British. DENMARK Secretary Acheson met with Danish Foreign Minister Kraft on Saturday and strongly stated the necessity of finding means to delay delivery of the tanker to the Soviet Union. The Secretary stated that he understood the difficulty of the Danish position but emphasized that the tanker would aid Communist air activity in Korea and that delivery would almost surely result in more restrictive US legislation. The Secretary stated that Harriman would have no alternative to aid termination if the delivery were effected in the next few days, but that a reasonable delay would give us an opportunity to consider an alternative to aid termination. The Secretary fears that despite Kraft's awareness of the seriousness of the action the tanker will be delivered about July 7th. Meanwhile Ambassador Anderson has estimated the situation which would result from termination of aid to Denmark. She states that the Danes would feel the equivalent of being kicked out of NATO and agrees with Kraft that our action would pull the ground from under supporters of NATO and create an atmosphere of opposition stronger and more difficult to overcome than existed prior to Danish entry into NATO. She predicts that the present government would cer- tainly fall and that no successor government could maintain a pro-NATO policy. Even if Denmark should remain in NATO, Anderson believes there would be an unfortunate reappraisal of Danish policy in the follow- ing fields: 1) military buildup; 2) US military facilities and operating rights; 3) Greenland; and 4) East-West trade. Anderson feels that ter - mination of aid would possibly go further to cause a breach between the US and our NATO partners and the action would put us in the ridiculous position of aiding and comforting the USSR. SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION