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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE and WASHINGTON Dept. 6, 1982 E.O. State By DEB NLT, Date 4-10-85 July 9, 1952 SEGRET SECURITY INFORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT On Monday British Embassy representatives delivered to the Department a paper concerning the British stand on Egypt. The paper expresses Mr. Eden's apprehension lest the fall of the Hilali Government and its replacement by Sirry Pasha might pave the way for the subsequent return to power of the nationalistic Wafd party, a con- tingency which would probably preclude any chance of reaching an agree ment on Anglo-Egyptian differences and which would probably portend another long period of attacks and disorders against the UK and Western interests. The paper states that whatever government is in power in Egypt it is useless to expect the British Government to concede recognition of King Farouk's title as "King of the Sudan" in the face of Sudanese un- willingness to accept Farouk as their king, and even if the British were prepared to recognize the title it would be a vain gesture since the Sudanese would not accept it and the only result would be trouble in the Sudan. The alternatives, therefore, are that either there is no settle - ment between Britain and Egypt and the British maintain their position at whatever cost, and if necessary by force, or that the Egyptians accept the kind of settlement which the British are prepared to offer. The paper recalls that Mr. Eden recently explained to Secretary Acheson in London exactly how far the British were prepared to go in order to meet legitimate Egyptian aspirations in the Sudan and outlined British proposals which would give Egypt a substantial share in the control of the future develop- ment of the Sudan. It reiterates, however, that it is useless to make an offer of this kind to Egypt concerning the Sudan or to discuss terms upon which the British might be prepared to withdraw British troops, unless the British Government is satisfied that it can be discussed with an Egyptian Government that is both able and willing to negotiate on a realistic basis, a possibility which would appear to be very slight unless Farouk can be prevailed upon to alter his attitude. The paper then states that Farouk will certainly not do this so long as he thinks that there is a difference in the approach of the British and the Americans, and unless the Americans are prepared to try to convince him to alter his attitude, there seems to be no chance at all and the British will have to resign themselves to standing a long seige SECRET SECURITY INFORMA TION