Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLTCNaval A delars OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 July 21, 1952 By DEB NLT, Date9-10-85 TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN Following receipt of joint recommendations from the US and UK Embassies in Tehran and an approach to the British Government by our representatives in London, UK Foreign Secretary Eden has in- - structed the UK Embassy here to inform the Department of his govern- ment's agreement to the extension by the US of immediate financial aid to Iran on condition that such aid be extended in a small amount as an interim stop-gap measure without promise that any more would be forthcoming, and that it would be tied in a general way to an oil settlement. The British Foreign Office also believes that there should be a public Iranian request before we announce any such aid and that the question of timing should be discussed with Iranian Prime Minister Qavam in order to assure that the tactics are worked out in a manner which would be most calculated to help him and to minimize opposition attempts to exploit the situation by repre- - senting the aid as an indication that the US and UK brought Qavam to power. Our Ambassador in Tehran has told Qavam that his request for aid was being considered by the US Government, but pointed out the various problems in connection with finding funds for such aid and satisfying US, UK and Iranian public opinion in the matter. Qavam agreed that it was important that any aid which the US might be able to furnish should be ar- ranged in such a way as to be acceptable to public opinion, and expressed his confidence that if we could give enough aid to permit his government to function over the next two months, the accomplishments of his govern- ment during that period would more than satisfy American public opinion that its money had been well invested. Meanwhile, however, Qavam has asked the Shah for authority in his discretion to dismiss the Majlis at a moment's notice in case it should become clear that the Majlis was unable to function because of the obstructionist tactics of the opposition deputies, some of whom were hiding behind parliamentary immunities while endeavoring to disrupt public order. He told the Shah that in any event he might find it necessary to arrest Nationalist leader Kashani in view of the latter's open incitement to rebellion, saying that unless he could be given a free hand in this emergency he would be compelled to resign. The Shah has decided, however, TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION