Extracted text

OCR Page 1 of 2
NLT(Naval Aide) 376 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE the WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 July 24, 1952 State NLT, Date 9-10-80 By DEB TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT: Following Wednesday's army coup Hilali has resigned as Prime Minister and King Farouk has authorized Ala Maher Pasha to form a new government. Maher had resigned the premiership last March. Farouk yesterday made a strong plea to the American Ambassador for British intervention "to save his throne". In Washington, the Department advised British Embassy representatives that in its view foreign intervention in what at present could be analyzed as a purely internal affair would be disastrous; that if, however, the situation further deteriorated and the lives of foreign nationals were in danger, a different problem would be presented. Subsequently, the British Foreign Office requested that Farouk be advised, thr ough Ambassador Caffery, that Her Majesty's Government could not inter- - vene with force in what appears to be an internal Egyptian problem. The British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Af- fairs has advised our Ambassador in London of reports that the army coup in Cairo was prompted solely for the purpose of redressing army grievances, that the army group had no political motives and that it was not concerned in disputes with other powers. The Group warned, however, that if the British intervened with force in Cairo it would resist. These reports confirm similar information received from Ambassador Caffery. IRAN: Our Ambassador at Tehran has suggested that State and Defense be prepared to withdraw the American military and gendarmarie (police training) missions from Iran on short notice. Since the Tudeh Party and the most extreme Nationalist elements have been particularly skillful during recent demonstrations in interweaving slogans demanding "withdrawa of American advisers" with those denouncing the Shah and Qavam, our Ambassador reasons that Mosadeq may almost immediately, after his cabinet confirmation, take measures which can lead only to withdrawal of the missions and perhaps to termination of US military aid. Mosadeq has steadfastly been unsympathetic to military missions and to military aid. It is believed that such concessions as he has made hitherto have been primarily for the purpose of placating the Shah, although it is possible TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMA