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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Flori
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
By EEK NLT, Date 9-10-
September 3, 1952
SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
BALTIC
While the Department is well aware of the delicacy of
MANEUVERS
the Bornholm phase of the Operation Main Brace, it
does not concur in Mr. Churchill's proposal that with
absolutely no further notice to anyone the commander of the operation, acting
ostensibly on his own authority, simply fail to carry out the Bornholm
exercise and in practice regard the 14 degree line as the eastern limit of
Main Brace. This view has been reinforced through a renewed study of
the problem within the Government in which comments of key US representa-
tives in the field were also solicited.
Accordingly, our Ambassador at London has b een
instructed to inform the British Foreign Office of our views that, under the
present circumstances, the Churchill proposal is not practicable or
advisable for the following reasons: (1) The Bornholm phase of the exercise
has been given wide publicity during the past week in Denmark as a result
of statements of the Danish Foreign Minister and Defense Minister; (2) in
view of statements of Danish authorities regarding Bornholm, cancellation
of that exercise would prove extremely embarrassing to the Danish
Government and would strengthen local Communists who have charged that
the maneuvers were provocative; (3) cancellation of the exercise at this
late date would not only be unfair to the Danes but would be considered highly
suspect by them and might lead to serious loss of confidence in Anglo-
American leadership, particularly in view of the Montgomery promise of
last year not to let them down; (4) cancellation of the Bornholm phase
whether now or during maneuvers would quickly become known and Soviets
would view cancellation as sign of weakness. This might well lead to
the Soviet belief that they could in the future afford to be bolder in the Baltic
and elsewhere and could be utilized by Soviet propagandists as an indication
of a rift between Denmark and other NATO countries; (5) action was taken
by the NATO Standing Group on August 18 to require that no foreign warships
visit Bornholm and a number of other precautions have been placed in
effect including non-violation of the Russian claim to a 12 mile territorial
limit and very definite restrictions on air craft flights and (6) the Baltic
maneuvers involve non-Danish forces no larger than those which have
LECRETSECURTY INFORMA TION'