Images (2)
Document
| id |
id
196064715
|
|---|---|
| contentType |
contentType
document
|
| source |
source
import
|
Source image fields (6)
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 2the
OFFICE OF
DECLASSIFIED
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
WASHINGTON
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By DEBNLT, Date 9-10-05
September 19, 1952
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
EGYPT
General Naguib sent an emissary, Lt. Col. Amin,
to Ambassador Caffery yesterday with a message
from the ruling military group, which made the following points:
1) After eight weeks of concentration on domestic issues, the
military now believe the time has come to move into the next
stage of the revolution and consider Egypt's international position;
2) They are completely on the side of the US and are unalterably
opposed to Communism; 3) Their first problem is to "sell the
US to the Egyptian public" and to educate the average Egyptian
on the dangers of Communism; 4) In order to sell the US to the
Egyptian public they need military supplies and financial aid from
the US; 5) In exchange they are prepared to give in secret certain
commitments concerning the long-term objectives of their move-
ment, including the MEDO and/or partnership with the US; and
6) They believe that to give commitments openly at this time would
destroy their chance of achieving their objectives, but they want
to work toward open commitments as rapidly as possible.
Col. Amin put the following questions to Caffery:
1) Would the US be interested in such cooperation? 2) What sort
of secret commitments would the US want? and 3) Would General
Naguib be acceptable as the author of such commitments ? Col.
Amin said again and again that Egypt has no intention of renewing
hostilities with Israel or with the British, and that ample guaran-
tees would be provided concerning the use of the materiel. He
also said that Egypt would accept help from the British.
Col. Amin asked Caffery's "personal" opinion
whether the time had now come when the Egyptians should estab-
lish some sort of closer relations with the British. Caffery said
that the time had come, and that he would suggest to Ambassador
Stevenson that a member of the British Embassy should be as-
signed as a liaison with the Egyptian military. Caffery emphasized
to Amin that our ultimate objective in Egypt was the realization of
the MEDO and that this could not be accomplished without British
participation. Amin "made noises about evacuation, ", says
Caffery, but in essence he agreed.
SECRET SECURIT INEORMATION