Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Naval Aids) 399 the OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE May DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 September 23, 1952 By DEB NLT, Date 9-10-85 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN On Friday we instructed Embassy London to show the British Foreign Office a draft press guidance on the Iranian oil situation and to ascertain its reaction. The press guidance, in answering a hypothetical request from a journalist to comment on reports regarding the efforts of certain American firms to purchase Iranian oil, said in part: "The US Government is not in a position to express any opinion on the legal questions involved or on the advisability of American private concerns enter- - ing upon arrangements to purchase and market Iranian oil.' Yesterday morning a representative of the British Embassy here called at the Department to argue against our use of the above. He gave the Department a copy of a telegram the British Embassy had received from the Foreign Office which objected most strenuously to any such statement to the press. The Foreign Office message admits that if the situation in Iran continues unchanged, the oil embargo may break down to some extent, but points out that it has not yet begun to do so. It says, moreover, that there is a fundamental difference between firms doing business in Iran against all the legal and political obstacles which have been placed in their way and against the express wish of their own governments, and their doing so with what amounts to the official encouragement or even the tacit approval of the US Government. The message states that the British Government will continue to help the AIOC defend its legal rights and to urge other friendly governments to do everything they can to prevent attempts by their nationals to purchase stolen oil. It adds that if the US Government were to give American oil companies grounds for assuming that it was a matter of indifference to the US Govern- ment whether they dealt in Iranian oil, the encouragement both to prospective dealers and to Mosadeq would be very great. Such an attitude would be tantamount to accepting Mosadeq's third con- dition (the British would have to recognize Iran's losses as a result of the oil embargo and restrictions on the use of Iran's sterling accounts) and would be rightly taken to display a split in the Anglo-American position. In relation to the visit of Mr. Alton Jones to Iran and his recently published statement, the message recalls the as- surances as to Mr. Jones' attitude contained in the President's message to Prime Minister Churchill on August 18th, and particu- larly the sentence: "I need not tell you that we have not the slight- est wish to profit by your present difficulties. We will do every- thing possible to avoid even the appearance of this.' TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION