Extracted text

OCR Page 1 of 2
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 Guidelines, March 6, 1982 September 24, 1952 State By Dept. DeB NLT, Date 9-10-8 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN In view of the British objections to a proposed US press guidance on Iran (which struck a "neutral" line concerning possible oil transactions and oil shipments from Iran in the face of the British oil embargo) we have agreed not to take this line but will emphasize for the time being that no formal reply has yet been received from Mosadeq to the joint Anglo- American proposals, and the Department will not discuss its future action in hypothetical situations. In regard to specific inquiries about Mr. Alton Jones, the Department will continue the assertion that Jones was in Iran entirely in a private capacity. We are advising the British that although for the present the US Government's official position remains as stated above, the Department considers that the grave difficulty in meet- ing the British views is that they suggest no outcome of the oil dispute, and we cannot foresee any outcome on terms mutually satis- factory to both parties. The principal argument we have used in the past in endeavoring to discourage private contracts has been that such contracts would lessen the chances of amicable settle- ment of the oil dispute. The Department has always believed and we have told the British many times that in the absence of a settle- ment, the tremendous pressure of Iranian oil to find a market would inevitably result at some time in a break of the so-called blockade. We do not believe it would be profitable to further commit the US Government in supporting a position on the block- ade which, in our judgment, cannot be held. We are telling the British that, if they do not have some positive suggestion to con- tribute, it does not seem appropriate for them to inform us that US-UK relations must be preserved on the basis of an operation for which there is little hope for a successful outcome. AFGHANISTAN Our Embassy in Kabul feels that we should take a more positive role in countering the recent Soviet pressure on Afghanistan which has developed, beginning last month with the Soviet protest concerning French oil pros- pecting in the northern part of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Government's fears center on the economic results of a possible abrogation of the Soviet barter agreement and the political and military potentialities of Soviet subversion in the North. It is SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION