Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Nau21 (Aide)402 OFFICE OF A E.O. Guidelines, March 4-10-85 6, 1982 12065, Sec. 3-402 DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON State Dept. DEB NLT, Date September 29, 1952 By TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATTON SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS USSR In commenting on the Pravda attack on himself, Ambassador Kennan states that the attack has a background far deeper than the particular interview in question and reflects ulterior motives. Kennan states that had the story not been seized upon by the Soviets it would have passed almost unnoticed in world opinion. He believes that his vigorous reaction to the Soviet anti-American propaganda campaign and his position in the Moscow diplomatic corps may contribute to a possible ex- planation for the attack. Moreover, in general the Soviets are uncomfortable about having in their midst anyone with a long background and experience in Soviet affairs and whose memories and acquaintances go back farther than is wise for even Soviet memories and acquaintances to go. However, Kennan believes that the most important explanation is that his presence in Moscow was unwelcome in some quarters precisely because his position was known to be relatively moderate and conciliatory and against which the political line now being followed by the Soviet regime would in the long run prove not effective. This was regarded with alarm by elements now dominant in the Communist party who had committed themselves extensively to the present line. These people want Kennan out of Moscow because they feel that if the time should come when he would have occasion to talk to Stalin the results of such discussions would not only prove disrupting to the policies these people have been urging but would also re- veal the extent to which they have consistently misinformed him about the outside world. Kennan states that he is unfortunately convinced that his presence in Moscow has been all along a domestic issue within the Soviet hierarchy and has recently been placing a strain on present policy lines which the dominant group is unwilling to tolerate any longer. In light of this attack, Kennan suggests that he not return to Moscow at this time but be ordered back to the United States for consultations. We have replied that we feel Kennan should avoid, pending further consideration, the impression that he is not intending to return to Moscow. IRAN Embassy Tehran states that if the US considers it really important to prevent Iran from drifting be- hind the Iron Curtain it should, regardless of the outcome of the oil dispute, be prepared to make a decision at an early date to come forward with economic aid on a scale similar to that given Greece and Turkey. In the Embassy's opinion make-shift aid TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION