Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT/NAVAL AIDE)425 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON State Dept. DEB E.O. 12065, Guidelines, NLT, Date March 4-10-rs 6, 1982 November 10, 1952 By TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATTON SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA Ambassador Bowles has informed us that the Deputy British High Commissioner in India has told him in the strictest confidence of a conversation on October 31 between the Indian Ambassador in Peiping and Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai. The British have been given this information on a top secret basis and have warned us not to make our knowledge of it known to the Indians or others for fear that the source of information will be seriously prejudiced. In discussing the dead-lock in the truce negotiations in Korea Chou En-lai told the Indian Ambassador that if all POW's are sent to a neutral zone there are two possibilities: 1) certain "secret agents" may not come to the Communist side and 2) these "secret agents" may come but only for the purpose of causing intimidation. The Chinese Foreign Minister fully ac- cepted the possibility that these "secret agents' might not want to go back to China and because they were under orders of Chiang Kai-shek they could go back to him. The Indian Ambassador stated that both he and his Government were con- vinced that the Chinese were deeply shocked when the truce negotiations were broken off and that the Chinese are trying to find a way of continuing the truce talks. India believes that the reference to 'secret agents" among the POW's who might not go back to the Communists is highly significant. The Deputy British High Commissioner seemed to be in agreement with the Indian interpretation but indicated that it was possible that Chou En-lai had spoken about Chinese POW's in an attempt to build up further hope at Panmunjom and thus stall UN consid- eration and action at New York. Bowles himself believes that one possible explanation is that Chou En-lai is disturbed over the Government of India's private support of the UN position and is making an effort to confuse the situation and convince the Government of India of Communist good intentions. This is borne out by the absence of a clear unter-proposal. Bowles TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION