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OCR Page 1 of 2Net AIDO)
445
the 12065, Sec. 3-402
OFFICE OF
DECLASSIFIED
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
1982
WASHINGTON
State Dept. DEB ECO. Guidelines, NLT, Date March 9-11-85 6,
December 17, 1952
By
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
EGYPT
The British Government has accepted our suggestion
to hold Anglo-American talks on Egypt. The British,
who would like to start the conversations as soon after Christmas as
possible, agree that their scope would be: 1) the terms on which the
UK Government could agree to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone;
2) collaboration of the Arab states with the Middle East Defense Or- -
ganization; 3) military aid to Egypt as part of a general settlement;
and 4) economic aid to Egypt. Foreign Secretary Eden prefers that
the discussions occur in London, since the relevant information is
all readily available there.
Meanwhile, we are considering suggesting to the UK
that the southern Sudan question might be settled by an exchange of
secret communications at the time the UK-Egypt-Sudan agreement
is signed, accepting the UK interpretation that in the exercise of
his broad powers the Governor General of the Sudan has special re-
sponsibilities for the more primitive southern area. Such an ex-
change might, in our view, satisfy both British and Egyptian concern
over this matter. We are sure the Foreign Office agrees that the
eventual discussions with the Egyptians concerning Suez would be
greatly enhanced by prior achievement of agreement on the Sudan
issue.
IRAN
Our Ambassador to London is concerned over in-
dications that we might explore a lump sum settle-
ment of the Iranian oil compensation issue with Prime Minister
Mosadeq either without checking further with the British or in spite
of their objections. Ambassador Gifford thinks it would be most
unwise in principle for us to discuss with Mosadeq such an approach
to the compensation problem unless we at least have British acquies-
ence to our doing so. He seriously questions whether the seemingly
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORIATION