Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Noval Aide) 146 09 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 January 2, 1951 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 9-4-00 TOPERET SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS USSR The Soviet reply to the recent US, UK and French communications suggesting possible exploratory four-power talks on outstanding differences states that our note is considered an acceptance of the Soviet proposal for a CFM on the de- militarization of Germany. The note implies that this issue has already been accepted as the first agenda item and that other issues, which the USSR indicates a willingness to discuss, can only be con- sidered after this question has been settled. The Soviet reply rejects the notion that there is any present threat to the western world and in usual propaganda fashion reiterates that the west is now rearming West Germany in violation of the Potsdam agreement. The reply accepts the idea of preliminary talks, preferably in London, Paris or Moscow, for the purpose of developing an agenda for the actual CFM, but points out that consideration of questions to be discussed by the four ministers could not be included in these talks. Our Embassy in Moscow comments that this reply indicates no change in the basic Soviet position on Germany and appears to be designed less for immediate propaganda advantage than for the purpose of maintaining flexibility for propaganda successes during the talks themselves. JAPAN Our Political Adviser in Tokyo has been informed by the British Ambassador that the highest levels of the British Government now agree that a Japanese peace treaty is highly desirable and must be negotiated without delay. On the question of rearming Japan, the British Chiefs of Staff feel this is inevitable and hope it can be undertaken as early as possible, though they believe little can be done along this line pending the negotiation of a treaty of peace. Meanwhile the chief liaison officer of the Soviet Mission in Tokyo has proposed to one of our military representatives that there should be an informal exchange of views between the two on Japanese issues, commenting that the Soviet position on the Japanese treaty was that Japan should not be rearmed to a point where it could undertake aggressive action. This officer pointed out that there were no USSR military personnel engaged in Korea and there would be none, but if US troops crossed the Soviet frontiers the whole weight of the Soviet army would be thrown into battle. TOP SECRET