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OCR Page 1 of 2NLTCNaval Aide) 167
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
the
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
12065, Sec. 3-402
1982
February 5, 1951
State DEB Dept. E.O. Guidelines, NLT, Date March 9435 6, TOP
E
T
By
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
CHINA
In a further conversation between Ambassador Henderson
in New Delhi and the Secretary General of the Indian
Foreign Office concerning the Indian delegate's statement in the General
Assembly to the effect that his Government had been informed on the
highest authority that once there was a condemnatory resolution on China
there would be no hope of peaceful settlement, Henderson was informed
that the message from Chou En-Lai contained the statement that "if any
attempt is made to combine condemnation of the Chinese with a proposal
for a conference, China could not accept it". Henderson again told the
Secretary General that the US was endeavoring sincerely to understand
the nature of Indian foreign policy and policy aims but that it had some
difficulty in determining what means India would propose to use to check
aggression in Asia if not by present UN procedures. He was told in reply
that it was difficult for India to make a general statement and that the
means which India would favor for checking aggression would depend
upon the form and character of the aggression and upon the effect which
such means might have upon world peace. The Indian official added that
India's proposals for dealing with Communist China's intervention in
Korea had been set forth in the 12-power draft resolution.
USSR
Embassy Moscow concurs in the view that if we are to
have any appreciable hope of achievement of a united
Germany oriented toward the West, the consolidation of Europe including
at least West Germany and the creation of a strong Western defense are
conditions precedent to such unification. The Embassy believes that
presentation of a concrete plan of wide scope and obviously addressed
toward relaxation of the principal points of tension should go far to re-
tain the initiative which has been ours since the formation of NATO and
to counter European "neutralist" sentiment. As for the nature of such a
plan, the idea of establishing a defense ceiling is attractive. While
agreeing that limiting proposals to creation of a parity of forces in
Germany would be inadvisable and inadequate to meet the broader con-
siderations of the present situation, the Embassy is apprehensive of a
T-O.P