Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Naval Aide)176 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE like WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 March 1, 1951 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 FOP By, DEB NLT, Date 9-Y-85 S E C R E SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS MEETING OF Our Embassy in Moscow has informed us FOREIGN MINISTERS that the Soviet Government has accepted the tripartite proposal for a preliminary meeting in Paris March 5 to undertake preparation of an agenda for a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. The Soviet note, handed to our Ambassador at 1:40 p. m. Moscow time, today, is brief; it states that it considers our note of February 19 a rejection without foundation of the "facts" cited in the Soviet note of February 5 and expresses agreement to the "meeting of Deputies". INDIA The Indian Minister of Food, generally considered as pro-American, has ex- pressed to our Ambassador his concern about the likely results of Security Council consideration of the Kashmir resolution sponsored by the US and UK. He said that rightly or wrongly, most Indians feel US sponsor ship is a retaliation for the Indian attitude regarding Korea, and if the matter came before the Security Council, the Indian attitude at mildest would be that the Council could take whatever action it desired but India would refuse to cooperate. It was even conceivable that the course of debate might be such to induce India to withdraw from the UN. India would be forced psychologically toward the side of the Soviets and Communist China, the latter of which is now endeavoring to placate India by reaching an accommodating agreement with Tibet, The Soviets would play India's side in the Council and probably use the veto. In the Minister's view the whole outlook was threatening, especially since the US and UK did not seem to be aware of the intensity of Indian feeling. He mentioned that India felt it had been let down by the British in the Commonwealth Conference in London, in General Assembly action label- ing Communist China an aggressor, and now in a resolution strongly favoring Pakistan. His implication was that Britain had yielded to the US in each case. and shoul los base India as not toing what if should FOR peace. The attitude is notsound SECRET