Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLTCNaval Aidel184 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 March 19, 1951 By DEB NLT, Date 9-4-85 TO P E C R E I SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS FOUR-POWER - The twelfth session of the quadripartite EXPLORATORY TALKS talks held in Paris on Saturday produced no new substantive developments. How- ever, it did provide an opportunity for Mr. Jessup to emphasize that Gromyko's admission in Friday's session that the Foreign Ministers could discuss any question on an agenda does away with the Soviet contention that the Ministers could not discuss the questions of German demilitarization and reduction of armaments unless they were included as separate items on the agenda. The French delegate expressed the view that the substance of Gromyko's remarks during the past two days is that the three powers must agree not only to the substance of the Soviet proposals but also to expressing these proposals in exactly the same words used by the Soviets. The British delegate remarked that the only explanation for the Soviet position is their desire to obtain an agreement in which the Foreign Ministers undertake dis- - cussion in a manner committing them in advance on the subject questions. The Deputies agreed to meet again at 4 p.m. today. In a discussion held at the British Embassy in Paris, the new British Foreign Secretary, Morrison, askedfor an analysis of the situation by Mr. Jessup. In response to Mr. Jessup's exposition stressing the obvious Soviet design to interfere with the execution of the Brussels decisions through the adoption of a slanted agenda or propa- ganda based on it, Morrison stated firmly that the British parliamentary position fully supported the Brussels decisions and that he personally firmly backs that policy. The British seemed fully aware of the necessity for tri- partite solidarity. In examining developments in Paris to date, Embassy Moscow has concluded that in spite of continued Soviet insistence on certain agenda points and preference as to the order of their consideration, the Soviets will in the long run make adjustments necessary to continue on to a Ministerial meeting in order to be able to continue their propaganda and psychological warfare. This warfare is based on a line TOP SECRE T