Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE the WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 April 23, 1951 By DEB NLT, Date 9-4-85 SECREI SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS UNITED KINGDOM Ambassador Gifford interprets Aneurin Bevan's resignation as an open move against the present Labour Party leadership and an attempt to capture the labor movement after a period of opposition. Gifford says Bevan probably feels that a Tory victory will ensue in the next elections and that as a result the present Labour Party leaders will be discredited. Gifford points out that the political situation in Britain in the immediate future will be most unstable, and he hazards the following predictions in the order of their probability: 1) Early dis - solution of Parliament and elections probably in June; 2) Attempts by the Government to carry on despite an openly rebellious faction on its back bench, in which case the Government would be dependent on Conservative support on issues opposed by Bevan and his followers; and 3) Formation of a national government headed by Attlee, which is least likely because the Conservatives are confident they will win the next election and are thus unwilling to take part in a coalition. FOUR POWER Little progress was made at the 35th session PARIS TALKS of the talks on Saturday, but at a Soviet buffet Saturday evening Gromyko approached Jessup and began to discuss how the Deputies might go on and finish up their work, pointing out that they had already agreed on parts of Item 1, on the German unity and peace treaty item, the Trieste item, the Austrian item, and the Balkan treaties item. When Gromyko mentioned the NAT and US bases item, Jessup told him we simply could not agree that three parties to the 12-power treaty could agree with the USSR that it was even a basis for discussion by the four powers. Jessup says Gromyko seemed to accept this statement and made no reference to including this item. Gromyko turned back to Item 1 and remarked to Jessup that unless the other powers accepted the Soviet draft on the reduction of armaments the prospect of an agreement was very dark.