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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85
May 2, 1951
SECRE
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
IRAN
Ambassador Grady talked to ex-Prime -
Minister Ala yesterday who gave him the
following information concerning his resignation. The Oil Commit-
tee under Mossadeq's chairmanship consistently ignored the govern-
ment and went directly to the Majlis without consulting Prime
Minister Ala. Ala called on Mossadeq several times and urged him
not to present the Oil Commission's resolution to the Majlis until it
could be given careful consideration. Mossadeq was completely
adamant on this point and told Ala he had already arranged with the
President of the Majlis to call a special session to act on the resolu-
tion. When Ala pointed out that he would be obliged to resign under
such circumstances Mossadeq sought to dissuade him and, in the
course of the ensuing conversation, Mossadeq assured Ala that he
had no intention of taking any drastic steps regarding the AIOC.
Mossadeq indicated he realized the need for continued unimpeded
operation of the Company and his program was to train young
Iranians abroad for the technical and administrative jobs of the Com-
pany so that in time they could replace the British. Grady comments
that the above would, if true, be reassuring, but he is inclined to
doubt whether Mossadeq's statement to Ala can be taken at face value
since it stands in contradiction to his many public statements. He
adds, however, that Ala seems anxious to be helpful to Mossadeq
and it may be that Ala will have the influence to restrain and possibly
to direct Mossadeq along sound lines in the future.
FOUR POWER
Ambassador Jessup has suggested the
PARIS TALKS
possibility of the Western Powers sending
identical ide-memoires to the Soviet
Union several days after the presentation of the "triple play" agenda
proposals, in case Gromyko shows a further tendency to drag out the
debates, to return to mere propaganda blasts, or to attempt to drag
further concessions out of the Western Powers. Jessup also submitted
SECRE