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OCR Page 1 of 2Aide) 211
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
the
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
June 12, 1951
By DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85
TOP SECRET
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
PARIS FOUR POWER TALKS
At the 67th meeting yesterday the
Soviet delegate charged that the
French were prolonging the conference here in the interest of their own
internal political affairs. He said that the French press had made it
clear that it would be "inconvenient to make the conference briefer in
view of the French elections", but that the Soviet delegation would not be
governed by questions of French political considerations or whether any
subject was "convenient" to the Western governments. He said these re-
marks were necessary in order to stress the thought that there is no sense
in prolonging the meeting here and objecting to the inclusion of the NAT
item on the agenda; the Soviet delegation had been quite patient up to now
and would continue to be, and the Soviet delegation was willing to remain
as long as necessary to reach agreement. However, he concluded, he
wanted the three governments to understand that it was impossible to
consider any agenda satisfactory which did not include the NAT.
Jessup yesterday gave the French and
the British copies of our draft note "A" (one of three drafts we have
worked out) for their study. This is intended as a text which would be
sent to the Soviets on June 15th and which would again highlight the
reasonableness of the Western position and the unreasonableness of the
Soviet position, without any intimation of a break in the meetings. The
French and British agreed to study the text overnight, but Jessup is
pessimistic over French acceptance of the draft.
JAPANESE TREATY
The British Cabinet agreed yesterday
morning to accept our formula on
Chinese accession to the Japanese treaty, whereby neither Chinese
"Government" would sign the original multilateral peace pact with Japan,
and it would be left to the Japanese to determine which Chinese "Govern-
ment" it wished to deal with.
TOP SECRE