Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Naval A:del277 the OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON State By DEB NLT, Date 9-585 Dept. E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 12065, Sec. 3-402 November 7, 1951 T -O S E € SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN The Department yesterday requested our UN delegation to advise whether our contact with Mr. Eden thus far indicated that the Department would be justified in encouraging Prime Min- - ister Mosadeq to postpone his return to Tehran for a few days more in an- ticipation of a renewal of negotiations with the UK on an oil settlement. The Secretary replied that he had just seen Eden and had expressed our concern lest the possibilities of an Iranian settlement should again deteri- orate through inaction. Eden replied with the assurance that the UK had no desire to fade out of the negotiation. Eden also disclosed that some senior British officials from the Ministry of Fuel and Power were arriving in Paris today with a full statement of the British position which he pre- - sumed had cabinet approval. The Secretary accordingly advised the Depart- ment to endeavor to restrain Mosadeq from announcing his departure from Washington at least until the outcome of the talks between the above-men- tioned officials and Mr. Eden is known. USSR Our Embassy in Moscow comments that the International Economic Conference which the Soviets have just re- scheduled for April 1952 is intended to be more than purely a propaganda move. The sponsors of course have propaganda aims high in mind, says the Embassy, but they also hope for definite results in a drive to relax the trade restrictions on the Soviet orbit. The recurring postponements of the meeting probably reflect the Soviets' realization that the Conference would probably fail in its objective unless the roster included more representative elements than have so far been recruited. If the Soviets fail to use exist- ing international organizations, the Embassy continues, it is because they recognize them as insufficiently susceptible to Soviet pressure and because past Soviet efforts to manipulate them have been barren. Thus the Moscow international conference would strive to build up public pressures, particu- larly within West European countries, as long as international organizations dominated by the West European governments were considered to be un- friendly to Soviet trade proposals. FOPSECRET