Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Mamil Ardel 290 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON Dept. 12065, E.O. Guidelines, March 9-6-8 6, 1982 November 30, 1951 State By DEB NLT, Date TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA Defense Department officials recently indicated to the Department that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would review their position concerning inspection in the Korean armistice negotiations if a British commitment could be obtained to support enlarged military action by the UN against China in the event the Communists should renew the attack following the conclusion of an armistice. The Department thereupon dis- - cussed this informally with the British Embassy which was non-committal, but which passed the matter on to Mr. Eden for consideration. On Wednesday evening in Rome the Secretary outlined to Mr. Eden our present belief that in order to secure an armistice in Korea we would have to accept less than adequate inspection provisions. He added that, since this would increase the danger to UN forces, we wished to offset the danger by issuing a public statement pointing out that any breach of the armistice would create a serious situation in which it would be impossible to localize the conflict. He said that Ridgway needed instructions within a few days on the type of inspection he should seek and assurances concerning other sanctions which would be available for the protection of UN forces. Mr. Eden said that he thought the issue boiled down to three distinct questions: 1) instructions to be given to Ridgway on the inspec- tion issue; 2) the decision to make a public statement; and 3) the form of further action which might be taken. He said he felt it was very important to settle all three points now and get the matter quite clear in our minds so there could be no later misunderstanding of what was agreed. Eden had re- - servations as to the kind of public statement to be made, and he inquired also in regard to point 3 above whether we would want to do more than bomb airfields north of the Yalu river. Mr. Lovett and General Bradley, who also took part in the meeting, replied that we did want to bomb more than these airfields and that something in the nature of a blockade would be necessary. Mr. Eden questioned a statement made by General Bradley to the effect that the number of ships going into China had nearly doubled in 1951, particularly as this concerned Hong Kong. Eden expressed the "purely personal" view that bombings north of the Yalu would present fewer difficulties for the UK than a blockade of China, and he stressed the importance of doing as much as possible to reach our objectives on inspection, in the hope that TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION