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OCR Page 1 of 2NET (Navil Aide) 321
DECLASSTIDA
OFFICE OF
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
State By DEB NLT, Date 9-9-85
Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 WASHINGTON
January 31, 1952
TOR-SEGRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
FRANCE
We have informed our Embassy in Paris that, after
examining figures relating to the French military budget
and defense program, we find it difficult to believe that the expected
financial shortfall should entail quite the extreme degree of consequences
which the French have set forth. It is our opinion that careful screening
of the budget and taking into account US aid to Indochina would reduce the
shortfall to a figure of some 200 billion francs or less. We have asked
the Embassy's confirmation of our estimate. Our message points out
that the French claim that they must reduce their equipment production
drastically is particularly hard to believe because an examination of the
figures indicates that the shortfall, when applied to force levels, hardly
seems to warrant such disproportionate reductions at those levels.
EGYPT
Ambassador Caffery has commented that the deep
seated distrust of the British on the part of the Egyptians
makes direct conversation between them difficult. The Egyptians always
want to bring the US into discussions, but not the French or the Turks.
Caffery agrees with our suggestion that the UK might, in order to open
conversation suggest talks on all outstanding differences including both
defense and the Sudan. He reiterates that, in his opinion, the Sudan ques -
tion can not be excluded. An emissary of the King came to see him again
yesterday to insist that without recognition of the Sudan title, talks con-
cerning defense proposals would be purely academic.
Embassy London reports that the British Foreign Office
is still evaluating the new government and situation in Egypt before deter-
mining what steps it will take next. It appears to believe that the first
priority is to encourage the new government to deal vigorously with the
internal security and terrorist problems, while watching carefully for a
break which might make conversations possible. A Foreign Office official
has indicated that the British are aware of the unpleasant ring which
reference to "four power proposals" may have in Egyptian ears. He
stressed the difficulties which the Foreign Office has experienced in evolving
a new formula for the Sudan. The Governor General of the Sudan states
that suggestions made so far would not be understood by the Sudanese and
might well lead to violence. The official commented "It is no goqd solving
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