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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
DE ASSIFIED
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
they
V
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3.402
WASHINGTON
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By DEB NLT, Date 9-4-85
February 27, 1952
SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
EGYPT
We have informed our Embassy in Cairo that we are
encouraged that March 1 has now been set as the
date for the first meeting between the Egyptian Prime Minister and
British Ambassador Stephenson to discuss resumption of negotiations
on the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. However, we feel that a repetition of
statements for popular consumption similar to a recent statement by
the Egyptian Prime Minister will not contribute to the proper atmo- -
sphere for the resumption of conversations and have suggested that
Ambassador Caffery, if he considers it appropriate and useful, should
convey this view to the Prime Minister. Meanwhile, our Embassy in
London has discussed with the UK Foreign Office the question of the ex-
tent of participation of other countries in the negotiations. The UK For -
eign Office believes that it is unlikely that the Egyptians will desire to
engage in five-power discussions until after bilateral discussions have
been completed. The Foreign Office also feels it has already served
notice to the French and the Turks that five-power talks are a possibility
by informing them that the UK has no fixed views and is willing to con-
sider the Egyptian's views as to whether conversations in the first in-
stance should be on: 1) an Anglo-Egyptian basis and then move into the
five-power - phase; 2) five-power discussions at the outset; 3) any other
suggested basis the Egyptians may put forward.
JAPAN
In commenting on reports from Taipei concerning
the adverse effects of the recent Japanese Diet de-
bates on the pending negotiations for a bilateral treaty between the
Japanese and Chinese Nationalist Governments and on public opinion on
Formosa, our political advisor in Tokyo points out that the Chinese
Nationalists are apparently unaware of the extent of the Japanese public
reluctance to deal with the Chinese Nationalist Government on a basis
other than as a local regime. He believes that Japanese Prime Minister
Yoshida has performed a difficult feat in the heat of Diet debates on his
Chinese treaty policy by fending off the attacks of the opposition parties,
virtually all of which object to the current bilateral treaty negotiations.
The Japanese public tends to view the treaty with the Chinese Nationalists
with some suspicion and the Japanese Government is under continuous
heavy pressure from business and other groups demanding that the door
SECRET SEGURITY INFORMATTON