Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE Dept. 12065, Sec. March 3-402 E.O. Guidelines, 9-9-55 6, 1982 WASHINGTON State By DEB NLT, March 12, 1952 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS USSR Mr. Eden telephoned Ambassador Gifford yesterday to urge that the US and Great Britain should consult before making any public comments in regard to the Russian note on the German peace treaty. Gifford has commented to the Department that there will probably be a strong public reaction in the UK in favor of a positive response to the Soviet note, par- ticularly in the left-wing of the Labor Party. Gifford also warns that there is a widespread belief in Britain that the US tends to reject out of hand any Soviet overtures, and feels that this makes it all the more important to coordinate fully with the British and French the general lines of our reaction to the Soviet note. The Foreign Office has told our Embassy that it believes the over- riding consideration in our reply to the Soviets should be to prevent any delay in the contractual agreement with the Germans and the European Defense Community negotiations. It believes, moreover, that the worst possible development could be our involvement at this time in another face-to-face conference with the Russians which they could string out indefinitely. It would hope therefore to devise a reply roughly analogous to Adenauer's 14- point reply to the East German unification proposal last September, laying great emphasis on the necessary pre-conditions for unification. Mr. McCloy reports from Bonn that the High Commissioners dis- - cussed the Soviet note with Chancellor Adenauer yesterday. The French High Commissioner, M. Francois-Poncet, interpreted the note as another delaying tactic designed to tie up discussion in the same manner as the Austrian treaty, the Korean truce negotiations, etc. He felt that in replying the Allies should, on the assumption that the Soviet note pre-supposed general elections, reply that they have always been prepared to see general elections held in Germany when they could be certain that such elections would be free; the UN Commission, however, had not been allowed in the Soviet Zone. Until the Soviets manifested their good faith by establishing conditions for free elections their proposals could not be considered to be sincere. Chancellor Adenauer stated that the Federal cabinet had discussed the Soviet note that morning and that German policy would in no way be changed by the note. Adenauer said, however, that the Government's press officer had been instructed to develop a press campaign designed to clarify the picture, because he believed that the note was "seductive". Adenauer expressed the hope that no four-power conference would be held as a result of the note. SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION