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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (Naval Aide) 344
the
OFFICE OF
DECLASSIFIED
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
WASHINGTON
State NLT, Date 9-9-8
Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
March 28, 1952
By DEB
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
TUNISIA
The Department has instructed Ambassador Dunn in Paris to
approach M. Schuman and express our grave concern over the
arrest of the Tunisian Ministers by the French. He will say that suchan
act could embitter the situation in North Africa and the rest of the Arab
world for years to come and make it impossible for the indefinite future to
arrive at a sound evolutionary solution of the Tunisian situation along the
lines of the French reform program.
Dunn is to say that we think the only constructive approach
would lie in voluntary negotiations between France and Tunisia, and that
unless France initiates these promptly the US would not oppose the inscrip-
tion of the Tunisian matter on the Security Council agenda, as currently
proposed by Pakistan. We hope that the French, in addition to refraining
from taking any action against the Bey, will be liberal in their attitude as to
the composition of the Tunisian Government with which they would be willing
to negotiate the reform program.
KASHMIR Embassy London reports that, on the basis of high level dis -
cussions Wednesday evening plus a slightly more encouraging
telegram from Karachi, the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) has sent
the following comments on the Kashmir problem to the missions concerned:
1) It is essential to get the bargaining process started between Pakistan and
India; a detailed report by Dr. Graham and a Security Council resolution
should be avoided because of the attendant publicity which would only stiffen
the attitudes of the two parties; Graham should enter only a short report
asking for an extension of time; 2) Graham should avoid any suggestion at
this stage for partition and partial plebiscite in the Vale as this would only
divert attention from the immediate and essential objective of the quantum
of forces; 3) Dr. Graham should be given in general terms the ratio between
Indian and Pakistani forces in the disputed area which the US and the UK
would regard as reasonable and practicable - - the CRO suggests that the ratio
of 2 (Indian) to 1 (Pakistani) would be about right- - and Graham should use
this ratio in a loose sense in attempting to bring the two parties to work out
a mutually satisfactory limitation on their respective troops.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INF FORMATION