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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
Guidelines, March 6, 1982
September 26, 1950
State By. Dept. DEB NLT, Date 6-7-85
SECRET
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
USSR
A UK Foreign Office official has given the
Department copies of communications from the
UK Ambassador in Moscow containing his views on the Soviet re -
action to the turn of the military tide in Korea and the possibility
that the USSR might regard the occupation of North Korea by UN
forces as a cause for war. The UK Ambassador points out that,
although there have been no indications in Moscow of the official
Soviet reaction, the Soviet leaders undoubtedly are seeking means
to minimize Communist setbacks in Korea and its potential conse- -
quences. He believes that, while the Soviets presumably would
welcome a restoration of the status quo as originally proposed to
Gromyko, the Soviet leaders are considering the possibility that
UN forces will occupy North Korea and ways of either: 1) fore-
-
stalling such occupation, or failing this, 2) neutralizing the danger
it would constitute. He feels that the Russians will be hesitant to
put forward detailed proposals on either count but would take full
advantage of any well-intended but naive proposals which might be
put forward at Lake Success. If no such opportunity is presented
to the USSR, he believes the main Soviet effort would be in the propa-
ganda field, where in addition to attempts to becloud a real setback
to Soviet plans, the Kremlin will be anxious to distract attention
from it by staging a diversion elsewhere with Berlin and Indochina
as obvious possibilities.
In analyzing the possibility that the USSR might
risk total war in order to restore its prestige and eliminate a threat
to its security, the UK Ambassador, after citing ar guments for and
against this possibility, concludes that the arguments against Stalin's
risking war seem the most likely to prevail. He points out that, if
this is so, the political tactics and publicity involved in settling the
Korean issue will have far-reaching consequences and will vitally
affect the course of events throughout Asia. He feels the handling
of the situation will provide a unique opportunity to remove Asiatic
suspicions of western selfishness and "American imperialism.
"