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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (Naual A.d.112
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
November 7, 1950
By, DEB NLT, Date 6-10-8570 P
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
KOREA
Upon receiving the message from the Secretary on
the subject of Chinese Communist military interven-
tion in Korea, Foreign Minister Bevin expressed his personal view to
Ambassador Douglas that the Chinese were so deeply involved in Korea
that they would not now settle voluntarily for less than a considerable
voice in the solution of the Korean situation. Bevin also expressed his
concern over the possibility that developments in Korea might tie up
extensive resources of the western powers and thereby undermine the
defense program in Europe. Subsequently, the UK Foreign Office in- -
formed Embassy London that the UK accepts our draft resolution on
Chinese intervention with slight modifications and will co-sponsor it in
the UN.
Meanwhile, Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler, in a
discussion of this problem with a member of our delegation, expressed
the opinion that the Chinese Communist action was a manifestation of
an "infantile disease" of the new Communist regime which, in its early
stages of development, lacks political judgment and that the Chinese
Communist invasion of Tibet and its reply to the Indian approach was
another manifestation of this disease and a colossal mistake. Bebler
is convinced that the Chinese Communists feel that the hydro-electric
works along the Manchurian border are threatened and that the UN
forces constitute a genuine threat to Manchuria. Bebler believes that
the Soviet Union is trying to develop this feeling and that assurances on
these two points by the US and the UN would help considerably in remov-
ing these issues from the current situation.
WESTERN
Ambassador Douglas in London has suggested to
EUROPE
Foreign Minister Bevin that, if the British Labor
Party leaders had not already done so, it might be
useful for them to approach the French Socialists on the possibility of
the French Government's adopting a more realistic approach to the
question of western European defense and that the help of the Dutch,