Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLTCMaval Aide)139 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 6-18-85 December 15, 1950 SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS UNITED NATIONS Following a discussion with the Chinese Com- munist representatives, UN Secretary General Lie informed Ambassador Gross that in his personal judgment there is now no hope whatever that a cease-fire could be arranged with the Chinese Communists and that the sooner the matter was disposed of, a vote taken on the six-power resolution, and the General Assembly adjourned, the better. Lie based this judgment on Chinese Communist representatives¹ reaction to his questions on the cease-fire resolution and on their blunt refusal to permit representatives of the International Refugee Organization to inspect prisoners-of-war - camps. With respect to the cease-fire resolu- tion, Chinese Communist representative Wu told Lie that the Chinese would not participate in negotiations regarding a cease-fire under any conditions "other than those mentioned in Mr. Malik's speech yesterday. 11 Wu then summarized these conditions as involving: 1) withdrawal of "all US and UN troops out of Korea, leaving Korea for the Koreans"; 2) settle- ment of the Formosa question in connection with any cease-fire discussions; and 3) any negotiations on these matters must be ''on equal terms, 11 which Lie interpreted as a reference to the seating of Communist China in the UN. Lie commented that Wu's replies appeared to be calculated and expressed his personal opinion that it was now clear that the Chinese Communist delegation was "under the thumb of Moscow. " With respect to Lie's desire for early adjournment of the Assembly, Ambassador Gross expressed the opinion that GA President Entezam will undoubtedly discuss with other members of his cease-fire committee the problem of the duration of the Assembly and his confidence that the committee will insist that the Assembly be in a stand-by position until the committee has reached some conclusion, whether affirmative or negative, on the possibilities of a cease- fire. Previously, Indian delegate Rau had informed our delegation that communications from Peiping received by India indicated that there was a good chance of a cease-fire being accepted by the Peiping regime if certain preliminary points could be solved. These points were: 1) the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, which Rau felt would TOPSECRET